

Political Science 549
Fall 2015
Monday 1:30 – 3:50 p.m.
404 David Kinley Hall

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Office: 315 David Kinley Hall
Office Hours: Wednesday 11:00 a.m. – 12:00 p.m.,
or by appointment

Topics in Comparative Politics: Governance and Accountability

Course Description

This seminar explores parts of the broad literature in political science and economics on the fundamental topics of governance and accountability. These terms are widely used in academic literature and in popular conversation, but do we really understand what they mean conceptually, and do we have ways of observing and measuring them? This course will ask students to develop their own answers to the following questions: (1) What is governance? (2) What is accountability? (3) How do we observe and measure governance and accountability? (4) Do elections make politicians accountable, and how? (5) What is clientelism, and how does it undermine accountability relationships? (6) Can we talk about governance and accountability in non-democracies? (7) What are the economic and public goods consequences of governance and accountability? and (8) Where does good governance come from?

Course Goals

Governance and accountability are core political science concepts. Students should leave the course with well-defined opinions on the meaning of these terms and with examples of how these concepts have been rigorously used in political science research as both explanatory and outcome variables. This course material is expected to help students who are preparing to take field exams in Comparative Politics or American Politics.

Through engagement with the readings in this course, students also are expected to improve a diverse set of social scientific skills related to (1) concept creation and definition; (2) measurement; (3) theory building; (4) reading and understanding formal theory; (5) empirical research design; (6) data collection; (7) data analysis; and (8) interpreting results for the purposes of prescribing policy.

Course Requirements

Our goal as a class is to better understand the ways in which the assigned authors have conducted their research, to critically interrogate the decisions that they have made, and to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of their particular approaches.

There are two assignments in the course that relate to this goal in different ways.

First, the course is organized as a reading seminar, where students are expected to *attend all sessions, complete all readings, and come to class fully prepared to discuss the readings*. The class is designed to be highly participatory. For each class meeting, one student will take responsibility for developing **a set of questions about (or brief critical commentaries on) the readings**. The student will distribute these questions – which should be around 600 words in length – to the entire class *no later than 5:00 p.m. the day before the seminar meeting*. Based on that day's conversation, the student will then write **an analytical essay** synthesizing some elements of the conversation in a way that critically engages with the readings. This essay is due to the instructor one week following the class meeting.

Although there sometimes seems to be an expectation that students offer devastating critiques or brilliant addendums to readings, the most educational moments for a class easily can come from questions that express a shortcoming of comprehension. If there is something that you have struggled with understanding, please feel free to write a question or comment based on that struggle.

The goal of these weekly questions and the subsequent analytical essay is to facilitate you interacting with the readings as a consumer in the way that you will interact with most academic output that you encounter over the course of your career.

Second, students will write a **research paper**. The paper may be either theoretical or empirical in nature, and it may be based on replicating an existing paper, but it must include original analysis (i.e., a review article is not an acceptable paper). Students should meet with the instructor early in the semester to discuss their intended topic.

Students will first submit a **research design** to the instructor that (1) briefly outlines the topic and research question; (2) states preliminary hypotheses; (3) discusses the data or analytical method that will be used to test these hypotheses; and (4) describes potential pitfalls of the research design.

Students will then submit both a **first draft** and a **final draft** of the paper. The paper should be organized with (1) an introduction; (2) a review of relevant literature; (3) a theoretical section; (4) a discussion of data and methods; (5) a presentation of results; and (6) a discussion of the results and possible future research directions.

The goal of this assignment is to have you carefully think through the steps of the research process as you will do throughout your career. The assignment has been broken down to help you think both about preliminary planning for research and also interpretation of research results.

The due dates for the assignments are as follows:

Analytical Essay	One week subsequent to assigned class
Research Design	Friday 2 October at 5:00 p.m.
First Draft of Paper	Friday 13 November at 5:00 p.m.
Final Draft of Paper	Friday 11 December at 5:00 p.m.

The distribution of grading is as follows:

Class Participation	10 percent
Preparation of Discussion Questions	10 percent
Analytical Essay	15 percent
Research Design	15 percent
Research Paper First Draft	20 percent
Research Paper Final Version	30 percent

Schedule of Readings

Readings listed under “*Additional Readings*” are suggested for your reference. All other readings are required. The instructor reserves the right to make changes to the reading list over the course of the semester. Students also are encouraged to bring particular readings of interest to the instructor’s attention and/or to make suggestions about modifications to the schedule of readings.

1. 24 August – Introduction

2. 31 August – Concepts and Theories of Accountability

Bernard Manin, Adam Przeworski, and Susan C. Stokes. 1999. “Introduction,” in Adam Przeworski, Susan C. Stokes and Bernard Manin, eds. *Democracy, Accountability, and Representation*. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1-26.

Mark Bovens. 2007. “Analyzing and Assessing Accountability: A Conceptual Framework,” *European Law Journal* 13(4): 447-468.

Ruth W. Grant and Robert O. Keohane. 2005. “Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics,” *American Political Science Review* 99(1): 29–43.

Robert J. Barro. 1973. “The Control of Politicians: An Economic Model,” *Public Choice* 14: 19-42.

Scott Ashworth. 2012. “Electoral Accountability: Recent Theoretical and Empirical Work,” *Annual Review of Political Science* 15: 183-201.

Additional Readings

Andreas Schedler. 1999. “Conceptualizing Accountability,” in Andreas Schedler, Larry Diamond and Mark Plattner, eds. *The Self Restraining State: Power and Accountability in New Democracies*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

Anna Persson and Martin Sjöstedt. 2012. “Responsive and Responsible Leaders: A Matter of Political Will?” *Perspectives on Politics* 10(3): 617-32.

J. S. Maloy. 2014. “Linkages of Electoral Accountability: Empirical Results and Methodological Lessons,” *Politics and Governance* 2(2): 13–27.

7 September – Labor Day – No Class

3. 14 September – Modeling Accountability

John Ferejohn. 1986. “Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control,” *Public Choice* 50: 5-25.

James Fearon. 1999. “Electoral Accountability and the Control of Politicians: Selecting Good Types versus Sanctioning Poor Performance,” in Adam Przeworski, Susan C. Stokes and Bernard Manin, eds. *Democracy, Accountability, and Representation*. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 55-97.

Torsten Persson, Gérard Roland, and Guido Tabellini. 1997. "Separation of Powers and Political Accountability," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 112(4): 1163-1202.

Eric Maskin and Jean Tirole. 2004. "The Politician and the Judge: Accountability in Government," *American Economic Review* 94(4): 1034-54.

Milan W. Svobik. 2013. "Learning to Love Democracy: Electoral Accountability and the Success of Democracy," *American Journal of Political Science* 57(3): 685–702.

Additional Readings

Francesco Caselli and Massimo Morelli. 2004. "Bad Politicians," *Journal of Public Economics* 88 (3-4): 759-82.

Ernesto Dal Bo. 2007. "Bribing Voters," *American Journal of Political Science* 51(4): 789-803.

Razvan Vlaicu and Alexander Whalley. 2012. "Hierarchical Accountability in Government: Theory and Evidence," University of Maryland, http://www.princeton.edu/econtheorycenter/pdf/Vlaicu_SSRN-id1925005%5B1%5D.pdf

Scott Ashworth, Ethan Bueno de Mesquita and Amanda Friedenberg. 2013. "Accountability Traps." University of Chicago. <http://home.uchicago.edu/bdm/PDF/traps.pdf>

4. 21 September – Observing Accountability by Studying Voters

Christopher J. Anderson. 2007. "The End of Economic Voting? Contingency Dilemmas and the Limits of Democratic Accountability," *Annual Review of Political Science* 10: 271-96.

G. Bingham Powell and Guy D. Whitten. 1993. "A Cross-National Analysis of Economic Voting," *American Journal of Political Science* 37: 391-414.

José Antonio Cheibub and Adam Przeworski. 1999. "Democracy, Elections, and Accountability for Outcomes," in Adam Przeworski, Susan C. Stokes, and Bernard Manin (eds.), *Democracy, Accountability, and Representation*. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 222-49.

Claudio Ferraz and Frederico Finan. 2008. "Exposing Corrupt Politicians: The Effects of Brazil's Publicly Released Audits on Electoral Outcomes," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 123(2): 703-45.

Dimitri Landa and Dominik Duell. 2015. "Social Identity and Electoral Accountability," *American Journal of Political Science* 59(2): 671-89.

Additional Readings

Brad T. Gomez and J. Matthew Wilson. 2007. "Economic Voting and Political Sophistication: Defending Heterogeneous Attribution," *Political Research Quarterly* 60(3): 555–8.

Raymond M. Duch and Randolph T. Stevenson. 2008. *The Economic Vote: How Political and Economic Institutions Condition Election Results*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Isabella Alcañiz and Timothy Hellwig. 2011. "Who's to Blame? The Distribution of Responsibility in Developing Democracies," *British Journal of Political Science* 41: 389-411.

Philip Edward Jones. 2011. "Which Buck Stops Here? Accountability for Policy Positions and Policy Outcomes in Congress," *Journal of Politics* 73(3): 764-82.

Shigeo Hirano and James M. Snyder. 2012. "What Happens to Incumbents in Scandals?" *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 7: 447-56.

Matthew M. Singer and Ryan E. Carlin. 2013. "Context Counts: The Election Cycle, Development, and the Nature of Economic Voting," *Journal of Politics* 75(3): 730-42.

Macartan Humphreys and Jeremy M. Weinstein. 2013. "Policing Politicians: Citizen Empowerment and Political Accountability in Uganda – Preliminary Analysis," International Growth Centre Working Paper, London.

Andrew Eggers. 2014. "Partisanship and Electoral Accountability: Evidence from the UK Expenses Scandal," *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 9(4): 441-72.

28 September – No Class

2 October – Research Designs Due

5. 5 October – Observing Accountability by Studying Governments

Timothy Besley and Robin Burgess. 2002. "The Political Economy of Government Responsiveness: Theory and Evidence from India," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 117(4): 1415-51.

Gregory A. Huber and Sanford C. Gordon. 2004. "Accountability and Coercion: Is Justice Blind when It Runs for Office?" *American Journal of Political Science* 48(2): 247-63.

James Snyder and David Strömberg. 2010. "Press Coverage and Political Accountability," *Journal of Political Economy* 118(2): 355-408.

James Alt, Ethan Bueno de Mesquita, and Shanna Rose. 2011. "Disentangling Accountability and Competence in Elections: Evidence from U.S. Term Limits," *Journal of Politics* 73(1): 171-86.

Claudio Ferraz and Frederico Finan. 2011. "Electoral Accountability and Corruption: Evidence from the Audit of Local Governments," *American Economic Review* 101: 1274-1311.

Additional Readings

Timothy Besley and Anne Case. 1995. "Does Political Accountability Affect Economic Policy Choices? Evidence From Gubernatorial Term Limits," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 110(3): 769-98.

Brandice Canes-Wrone, David W. Brady, and John F. Cogan. 2002. "Out of Step, Out of Office: Electoral Accountability and House Member's Voting," *American Political Science Review* 96(1): 127-40.

Monica Martinez-Bravo, Gerard Padró i Miquel, Nancy Qian and Yang Yao. 2011. "Do Local Elections in Non-Democracies Increase Accountability? Evidence from Rural China," NBER Working Paper No. 16948, April, Cambridge, MA.

6. 12 October – Concepts of Governance

Merilee Grindle. 2004. "Good Enough Governance," *Governance* 17(4): 525–48.

Sören Holmberg, Bo Rothstein, and Naghmeh Nasiritousi. 2009. "Quality of Government: What You Get," *Annual Review of Political Science* 13(12): 135-61.

Bo Rothstein. 2013. "The Three Worlds of Governance: Arguments for a Parsimonious Theory of Quality of Government," QOG Working Paper 2013:12, Göteborg, August.

Francis Fukuyama. 2013. "What is Governance?" *Governance* 26(3): 347-68.

Marcus Agnafors. 2013. "Quality of Government: Toward a More Complex Definition," *American Political Science Review* 107(3): 433-45.

Additional Readings

Bo Rothstein and Jan Teorell. 2008. "What Is Quality of Government? A Theory of Impartial Government Institutions," *Governance* 21(2): 165-90.

Matt Andrews. 2010. "Good Government Means Different Things in Different Countries," *Governance* 23(1):7–35.

Donald K. Emmerson. 2012. "Minding the Gap Between Democracy and Governance," *Journal of Democracy* 23(2): 62-73.

Geske Dijkstra. 2013. "Paradoxes around Good Governance," Inaugural Lecture, Erasmus University, Rotterdam, 15 March.

Mark F. Plattner. 2013. "Reflections on 'Governance,'" *Journal of Democracy* 24(4): 17-28.

7. 19 October – Measuring Governance

Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi. 2010. "The Worldwide Governance Indicators: Methodology and Analytical Issues," World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 5430, Washington, D.C.

Carmen R. Apaza. 2009. "Measuring Governance and Corruption through the Worldwide Governance Indicators: Critiques, Responses, and Ongoing Scholarly Discussion," *PS: Political Science & Politics* 42(1): 139-43.

Various Authors. 2013. APSA-Comparative Politics Newsletter. 23(1): 1-23.

Mireille Razafindrakoto and Francois Roubaud. 2010. "Are International Databases on Corruption Reliable? A Comparison of Expert Opinion Surveys and Household Surveys in Sub-Saharan Africa," *World Development* 38(8): 1057-69.

Daniel W. Gingerich. 2013. "Governance Indicators and the Level of Analysis Problem: Empirical Findings from South America," *British Journal of Political Science* 43(3): 505-40.

Cullen S. Hendrix. 2010. "Measuring State Capacity: Theoretical and Empirical Implications for the Study of Civil Conflict," *Journal of Peace Research* 47(3): 273-85.

Additional Readings

Ritva Reinikka and Jakob Svensson. 2006. "Using Micro-Surveys to Measure and Explain Corruption," *World Development* 34(2): 359-370.

Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, and Mastruzzi, Massimo. 2007. "Worldwide Governance Indicators Project: Answering the Critics," World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 4149, Washington, D.C.

Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi. 2009. "Governance Matters VIII: Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators 1996–2008," World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 4978, Washington, D.C.

Laura Langbein and Stephen Knack. 2010. "The Worldwide Governance Indicators: Six, One, or None?" *Journal of Development Studies* 46(2): 350-70.

Martin Knoll and Petra Zloczynski. 2012. "The Good Governance Indicators of the Millennium Challenge Account: How Many Dimensions are Really Being Measured?" *World Development* 40(5): 900-15.

8. 26 October – Governance and Economic Growth

Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson. 2001. "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation," *American Economic Review* 91(5): 1369-1401.

Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson. 2005. "Unbundling Institutions," *Journal of Political Economy* 113(5): 949-95.

Marcus J. Kurtz and Andrew Schrank. 2007. "Growth and Governance: Models, Measures, and Mechanisms," *Journal of Politics* 69(2): 538-54.

Macartan Humphreys and Robert Bates. 2005. "Political Institutions and Economic Policies: Lessons from Africa," *British Journal of Political Science* 35: 403-28.

Sebastian Dellepiane-Avellaneda. 2009. "Review Article: Good Governance, Institutions and Economic Development: Beyond the Conventional Wisdom," *British Journal of Political Science* 40: 195-224.

Additional Readings

Stephen Knack and Philip Keefer. 1995. "Institutions and Economic Performance: Cross-Country Tests Using Alternative Institutional Measures," *Economics and Politics* 7 (3): 207-27.

John W. McArthur and Jeffrey D. Sachs. 2001. "Institutions and Geography: Comment on Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2000)," NBER Working Paper No. 8114, Cambridge, MA.

Dani Rodrik, Arvind Subramanian and Francesco Trebbi. 2004. "Institutions Rule: The Primacy of Institutions Over Geography and Integration in Economic Development," *Journal of Economic Growth* 9: 131-65.

Jeffrey Sachs. 2003. "Institutions Don't Rule: Direct Effects of Geography on Per Capita Income," NBER Working Paper No. 9490, Cambridge, MA.

Stanley L. Engerman and Kenneth L. Sokoloff. 2008. "Debating the Role of Institutions in Political and Economic Development: Theory, History, and Findings," *Annual Review of Political Science* 11: 119-36.

Stephan Haggard, Andrew MacIntyre, and Lydia Tiede. 2008. "The Rule of Law and Economic Development," *Annual Review of Political Science* 11: 205-34.

David Y. Albouy. 2012. "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation: Comment," *American Economic Review* 102(6):3059-76.

Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson. 2012. "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation: Reply," *American Economic Review* 102(6): 3077-3110.

9. 2 November – The Origins of Good Governance

Nathan Nunn. 2008. "The Long Term Effects of Africa's Slave Trades," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 123(1): 139-76.

Lakshmi Iyer. 2010. "Direct versus Indirect Colonial Rule in India: Long-term Consequences," *Review of Economics and Statistics* 92(4): 693-713.

Robert D. Woodberry. 2012. "The Missionary Roots of Liberal Democracy," *American Political Science Review* 106(2): 224-74.

Thomas B. Pepinsky. 2013. "Colonial Migration and the Deep Origins of Governance: Theory and Evidence from Java," paper presented at the 2013 American Political Science Association annual meeting.

Nikhil Gaikwad. 2014. "East India Companies and Long-Term Economic Change in India," Yale University.

Additional Readings

Abhijit Banerjee and Lakshmi Iyer. 2005. "History, Institutions and Economic Performance: The Legacy of Colonial Land Tenure Systems in India," *American Economic Review* 95(4): 1190-1213.

Daniel Treisman. 2007. "What Have We Learned about the Causes of Corruption From Ten Years of Cross-National Empirical Research?" *Annual Review of Political Science* 10: 211-44.

Daniel Berger. 2009. "Taxes, Institutions and Local Governance: Evidence from a Natural Experiment in Colonial Nigeria," New York University.

Marcia Grimes. 2012. "The Contingencies of Societal Accountability: Examining the Link Between Civil Society and Good Government," *Studies in Comparative International Development* 48: 380-402.

Matthew Andrews. 2013. "How do Governments Get Great? Ten Cases, Two Competing Explanations, One Large Research Agenda," Center for International Development Working Paper No. 260, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University.

Nicholas Charron and Victor Lapuente. 2013. "Why Do Some Regions in Europe Have Higher Quality of Government?" *Journal of Politics* 75(3): 567-82.

10. 9 November – Accountability and Service Delivery

Alicia Adserá, Carles Boix and Mark Payne. 2003. "Are You Being Served? Political Accountability and Quality of Government," *Journal of Law, Economics and Organization* 19(2): 445-90.

Ritva Reinikka and Jakob Svensson. 2005. "Fighting Corruption to Improve Schooling: Evidence from a Newspaper Campaign in Uganda," *Journal of the European Economic Association* 3: 259-67.

Benjamin A. Olken. 2007. "Monitoring Corruption: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia", *Journal of Political Economy* 115(2): 200-49.

Martina Bjorkman and Jakob Svensson. 2009. "Power to the People: Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment of Community-Based Monitoring in Uganda," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 124(2): 735-69.

Lily L. Tsai. 2007. "Solidary Groups, Informal Accountability, and Local Public Goods Provision in Rural China," *American Political Science Review* 101(2): 355-72.

Richard Batley and Claire Mcloughlin. 2015. "The Politics of Public Services: A Service Characteristics Approach," *World Development* 74: 275-85.

Additional Readings

Karen Bakker, Michelle Kooy, Nur Endah Shofiani, and Ernst-Jan Martijn. 2008. "Governance Failure: Rethinking the Institutional Dimensions of Urban Water Supply to Poor Households," *World Development* 36(10): 1891-1915.

Benjamin A. Olken. 2010. "Direct Democracy and Local Public Goods: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia," *American Political Science Review* 104(2): 243-67.

Brian K. Min. 2013. "Electrifying the Poor: Power and Politics in India," University of Michigan.

Robin Harding and David Stasavage. 2014. "What Democracy Does (and Doesn't Do) for Basic Services: School Fees, School Inputs and African Elections," *Journal of Politics* 76(1): 229-45.

13 November – First Draft of Paper Due

11. 16 November – Clientelism

Isabela Mares and Lauren Young. 2016. "Buying, Expropriating, and Stealing Votes," *Annual Review of Political Science*. 40 pp.

James Scott. 1969. "Corruption, Machine Politics, and Political Change," *American Political Science Review* 63: 1142-58.

Susan C. Stokes. 2005. "Perverse Accountability: A Formal Model of Machine Politics with Evidence from Argentina," *American Political Science Review* 99(3): 315-25.

Simeon Nichter. 2008. "Vote Buying or Turnout Buying? Machine Politics and the Secret Ballot," *American Political Science Review* 102(1): 19-31.

Frederico Finan and Laura Schechter. 2012. "Vote-buying and Reciprocity," *Econometrica* 80(2): 863-81.

Rebecca Weitz-Shapiro. 2012. "What Wins Votes: Why Some Politicians Opt Out of Clientelism," *American Journal of Political Science* 56(3): 568-83.

Additional Readings

Andreas Schedler. 2002. "Might Cleaning Up Elections Keep People Away from the Polls? Historical and Comparative Perspectives," *International Political Science Review* 23(1): 69-84.

Leonard Wantchekon. 2003. "Clientelism and Voting Behavior: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Benin," *World Politics* 55(3): 399-422.

Philip Keefer. 2007. "Clientelism, Credibility and the Policy Choices of Young Democracies," *American Journal of Political Science* 51(4): 804-21.

Kate Baldwin. 2013. "Why Vote with the Chief? Political Connections and Public Goods Provision in Zambia," *American Journal of Political Science* 57(4): 794-809.

23 November – Fall Break – No Class

12. 30 November – Corruption

Eric C.C. Chang and Miriam Golden. 2006. "Electoral Systems, District Magnitude, and Corruption," *British Journal of Political Science* 37: 115-37.

Alejandro Ecker, Konstantin Glinitzer, and Thomas M. Meyer. 2015. "Corruption Performance Voting and the Electoral Context," *European Political Science Review*.

Eva Anduiza, Aina Gallego, and Jordi Muñoz. 2013. "Turning a Blind Eye: Experimental Evidence of Partisan Bias in Attitudes Toward Corruption," *Comparative Political Studies* 46(12): 1664-92.

Daniel W. Gingerich. 2009. "Corruption and Political Decay: Evidence from Bolivia," *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 4: 1-34.

Amanda Lea Robinson and Brigitte Zimmerman. 2015. "Who Bears the Cost of Corruption? The Impacts of Political Connections, Socioeconomic Status, and Shared Ethnicity."

Additional Reading

John G. Peters and Susan Welch. 1980. "The Effects of Charges of Corruption on Voting Behavior in Congressional Elections," *American Political Science Review* 74(3): 697-708.

Margit Tavits. 2007. "Clarity of Responsibility and Corruption," *American Journal of Political Science* 51(1): 218-29.

Carlos Pereira, Marcus André Melo, and Carlos Mauricio Figueiredo. 2009. "The Corruption-Enhancing Role of Re-election Incentives? Counterintuitive Evidence from Brazil's Audit Reports," *Political Research Quarterly* 62(4): 731-44.

Eric Chang, Miriam Golden, and Seth J. Hill. 2010. "Legislative Malfeasance and Political Accountability," *World Politics* 62(2): 177-220.

Alberto Chong, Ana L. De La O, Dean Karlan, and Leonard Wantchekon. 2015. "Does Corruption Information Inspire the Fight or Quash the Hope? A Field Experiment in Mexico on Voter Turnout, Choice, and Party Identification," *Journal of Politics* 77(1): 55-71.

13. 7 December – Decentralization and Accountability

Paul Seabright. 1996. "Accountability and Decentralisation in Government: An Incomplete Contracts Model," *European Economic Review* 40: 61-89.

Arun Agrawal and Jesse Ribot. 1999. "Accountability in Decentralization: A Framework with South Asian and West African Cases," *Journal of Developing Areas* 33(4): 473-502.

Raymond Fisman and Roberta Gatti. 2002. "Decentralization and Corruption: Evidence across Countries," *Journal of Public Economics* 83: 325-45.

François Gélinau and Karen L. Remmer. 2006. "Political Decentralization and Electoral Accountability: The Argentine Experience, 1983-2001," *British Journal of Political Science* 36(1): 133-57.

Krister P. Andersson, Clark C. Gibson, and Fabrice Lehoucq. 2006. "Municipal Politics and Forest Governance: Comparative Analysis of Decentralization in Bolivia and Guatemala," *World Development* 34(3): 576-95.

Additional Readings

Nick Devas and Ursula Grant. 2003. "Local Government Decision-Making: Citizen Participation and Local Accountability: Some Evidence for Kenya and Uganda," *Public Administration and Development* 23(4): 307-16.

Ashwini Chhatre. 2008. "Political Articulation and Accountability in Decentralization: Theory and Evidence from India," *Conservation and Society* 6(1): 12-21.

Jonathan Rodden and Erik Wibbels. 2011. "Dual Accountability and the Nationalization of Party Competition: Evidence from Four Federations," *Party Politics* 17(5): 629-53.

Maria Escobar-Lemmon and Ashley D. Ross. 2014. "Does Decentralization Improve Perceptions of Accountability? Attitudinal Evidence from Colombia," *American Journal of Political Science* 58(1): 175-88.

11 December – Final Papers Due

WINTER BREAK READING / OTHER POSSIBLE TOPICS

I. Natural Resources and the Fiscal Contract

Ross, Michael. 1999. "The Political Economy of the Resource Curse," *World Politics* 51 (2): 297-322.

Robert Bates and Donald Lien. 1985. "A Note on Taxation, Development and Representative Government," *Politics and Society* 14(1): 53-70.

James A. Robinson, Ragnar Torvik, and Thierry Verdier. 2006. "Political Foundations of the Resource Curse," *Journal of Development Economics* 79: 447-68

Laura Paler. 2013. "Keeping the Public Purse: An Experiment in Windfalls, Taxes, and the Incentives to Restrain Government," *American Political Science Review* 107(4): 706-25.

Additional Readings

Xavier Sala-i-Martin and Arvind Subramanian. 2003. "Addressing the Natural Resource Curse: An Illustration from Nigeria," NBER Working Paper 9804. Cambridge, Massachusetts.

Erwin Bulte, Richard Damania, and Robert Deacon. 2005. "Resource Intensity, Institutions and Development," *World Development* 33(7): 1029-44.

Humphreys, Macartan, Jeffrey D. Sachs and Joseph E. Stiglitz, eds. 2007. *Escaping the Resource Curse*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Sambit Bhattacharyya and Roland Hodler. 2010. "Natural Resources, Democracy and Corruption," *European Economic Review* 54(4): 608-21.

Haber, Stephen and Victor Menaldo. 2011. "Do Natural Resources Fuel Authoritarianism? A Reappraisal of the Resource Curse," *American Political Science Review* 105 (1).

II. Community Governance

Garrett Hardin. 1968. "The Tragedy of the Commons," *Science* 162(3859): 1243-48.

Elinor Ostrom. 2000. "Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms," *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 14(3): 137-58.

Brian Wampler. 2004. "Expanding Accountability through Participatory Institutions: Mayors, Citizens, and Budgeting in Three Brazilian Municipalities," *Latin American Politics and Society* 46(2): 73–99.

Arun Agrawal and Ashwini Chhatre. 2007. "State Involvement and Forest Co-Governance: Evidence from the Indian Himalaya," *Studies in Comparative International Development* 42(1-2): 67-86.

Jean-Pierre Olivier de Sardan. 2011. "The Eight Modes of Local Governance in West Africa," *IDS Bulletin* 42(2): 22-31.

Additional Readings

John Gaventa. 2002. "Toward Participatory Local Governance: Six Propositions for Discussion," *Currents* 29: 29–35.

Krister Andersson and Elinor Ostrom. 2008. "Analyzing Decentralized Resource Regimes from a Polycentric Perspective," *Policy Sciences* 41(1): 71-93.

III. Foreign Aid and Accountability

Deborah Brautigam and Steven Knack. 2004. "Foreign Aid, Institutions and Governance in Sub-Saharan Africa," *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 52(2): 255-85.

Nicholas Eubank. 2012. "Taxation, Political Accountability, and Foreign Aid: Lessons from Somaliland," *Journal of Development Studies* 48(4): 465-480.

Matthew Andrews. 2013. "Do International Organizations Really Shape Government Solutions in Developing Countries?" Center for International Development Working Paper No. 264, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University.

Additional Reading

Deborah Brautigam. 1992. "Governance, Economy and Foreign Aid," *Studies in Comparative International Development* 27(3): 3-25.

L. David Brown and Mark H. Moore. 2001. "Accountability, Strategy, and International Nongovernmental Organizations," *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly* 30(3): 569–587.

Robert Wade. 2009. "Accountability Gone Wrong: The World Bank, Non-governmental Organisations and the US Government in a Fight over China," *New Political Economy* 14(1): 25-48.

Tim Forsyth. 2009. "Multi-Level Governance in REDD+: Participation, Integration and Coordination," in Angelsen et al. *Realising REDD+: National Strategy and Policy Options*, available at http://www.cifor.cgiar.org/publications/pdf_files/Books/BAngelsen0902.pdf.