



**RESPONSIVE FOREST GOVERNANCE INITIATIVE (RFGI):
SUPPORTING RESILIENT FOREST LIVELIHOODS THROUGH LOCAL
REPRESENTATION**

**Choice and Recognition
Research Handbook**

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Glossary

Accountability has many definitions in the literature. Bovens (2006) provides a useful one by specifying the principals and the agents (accountor and accountee) of accountability and the substance (performance).¹ Goetz and Jenkins (2005:7) define accountability as “the ability to sanction poor performance by rulers in an effort to improve it.” In *Development as Freedom* arguments—Sen (1999) argues that the ability to hold leaders accountable is a central benefit of political liberty. The other central benefit is voice—shaping of shared values through deliberation. In common usage, increasing accountability usually refers to efforts that codify moral claims into law or efforts to bring de facto accountability closer to de jure ideals. These efforts aim to produce more just law and to assure that law is applied. These are efforts to enable less powerful actors who hold certain rights to place checks on more powerful actors whose actions affect them. In common usage, then Goetz and Jenkins (2005:11) point out that accountability is usually shorthand for ‘democratic accountability’, which refers to accountability to the people and to the legal framework. (See Goetz and Jenkins 2005:10-11). In RFGI we think of accountability as the ability of one body to sanction another in response to their actions (Agrawal and Ribot 1999). It constrains and limits people and institutions because it requires that those with power tell other people what they have done and why and because those other people have the authority to authorize sanctions (rewards or punishments) against the power wielders.

Choice – see ‘Institutional Choice’.

Citizenship is the ability to be politically engaged and shape the fate of the public polity in which one is involved. RFGI defines citizenship substantively as the ability to hold public leaders to account – where a public leader is a leader subject to broad public accountability. Those under the rule of a public authority but without the ability to influence that authority are called subjects (following Mamdani 1996).

For public leaders to hear local needs and aspirations and for leaders to be sanctioned by local people, the people must engage as citizens, expressing their needs and aspirations and holding leaders accountable for delivering on demands. Citizenship, like authority, requires *power* – the power to hold local leaders to account, the power to express needs and aspirations and to sanction leaders who do or do not deliver.² In short, democracy requires leaders and citizens with powers.³ Under democratic authorities, belonging is inclusive of those who reside in a jurisdiction—residency-based citizenship. In liberal democracies, citizenship is usually associated with entitlement to certain civil, social, and political rights irrespective of one’s identity and interests (Sparke 2004). These rights can enable

¹ “The most concise description of accountability would be: ‘the obligation to explain and justify conduct’. This implies a relationship between an actor, the accountor, and a forum, the account-holder, or accountee.... Explanations and justification are not made in a void, but vis-à-vis a significant other. This usually involves not just the provision of information about performance, but also the possibility of debate, of questions by the forum and answers by the actor, and eventually of judgment of the actor by the forum. Judgment also implies the imposition of formal or informal sanctions on the actor in case of malperformance or, for that matter, of rewards in case of adequate performance. This is what I call *narrow accountability*.” (Bovens 2006:9.)

² “In order for citizens to exercise the vote (a primary good), they first must have recognition as a member of the political community and a minimum level of: education, information, economic resources (e.g., transportation to the polls), and the personal security enabling them to pursue concerns beyond mere survival. However, great asymmetries of wealth and power produce great asymmetries in capabilities and thereby distort democratic participation and subvert justice. The capabilities component of justice thus reveals the interdependence of distribution, procedure and recognition (Schlosberg 2007). It also expands the scale of justice beyond the liberal focus on individuals to recognise that *groups* (e.g., communities of place, interest or ethnic identity) can also have capabilities, enjoy collective rights, suffer collective disadvantages, and form social movements.” (McDermott, Mohanty and Schrekenberg 2011:9).

³ Of course, those powers must be significant enough to matter to local people and to enable leaders to act. They can be executive, legislative or judicial powers (Agrawal and Ribot 1999).

popular engagement. But, “rather than merely focusing on citizenship as legal rights,” following Isin and Turner (2002:4), we accept that “citizenship must also be defined as a social process through which individual and social groups engaged in claiming, expanding or losing rights.” Citizenship has come to be a process of being politically engaged and of shaping the fate of the polity in which one is involved (Isin and Turner 2002). Hence, for RFGI, we define citizenship as the ability to hold leaders to account including the learned practice of doing so.

Decentralization is any act by which a central government formally cedes powers to actors and institutions at lower levels in a political-administrative and territorial hierarchy. Decentralization is typically divided into democratic decentralization and deconcentration (defined below).

Deconcentration (also known as Administrative Decentralization) concerns transfers of power to local branches of the central state, such as prefectures, administrations, or local technical line ministries. These upwardly accountable local bodies are appointed administrative extensions of the central state. While some downward accountability may be built into their functions, their primary responsibility is to central government. Deconcentration is considered the weaker form of decentralization because downward accountability is not as well established as it is in the democratic or political form of decentralization.

Democracy is substantively defined by the accountability of leaders to the people. Accountability is a means of ensuring responsiveness. Responsiveness is, of course, possible without accountability, but we call that state of affairs benign dictatorship. If the popular accountability is via elections it is called electoral or procedural democracy. We purposefully define democracy substantively, since elections, while important, are never a sufficient means for ensuring democracy. Other mechanisms of strengthening the substance of democracy include a vigilant and independent press (who bring important matters to the attention of the electorate) and vigorous opposition parties (who do the same). Weaknesses in any of these aspects can lead to ‘democratic deficits’ which is when the machinery of democracy may be present, but its performance less than ideal. Eg free and fair elections exist but the electorate does not vote; or the number of parties is insufficient to provide competition among parties; or the parties it chooses between are too similar for the choice to be meaningful, or the candidates are chosen by a set of distant parties; or the authorities elected have insufficient powers to respond to local demands; etc.

Democratic Decentralization (often also called *Political Decentralization* or *Devolution*) occurs when powers and resources are transferred to authorities—typically, elected local governments—that are representative of and accountable to local populations. Democratic decentralization aims to increase public participation in local decision making. Democratic decentralization is an institutionalized form of the participatory approach. Of the two primary forms of decentralization, democratic decentralization is considered the stronger and the one from which theory indicates the greatest benefits can be derived.

Democratic Representation occurs when a leader is responsive to the needs and aspirations of her or his population. When the population can sanction the leader so as to hold the leader accountable, then the representation can be considered democratic. Representation is at the heart of democracy and occurs when leaders are responsive to their people and the people under their jurisdiction are able to hold them to account.

Intervening Agents are higher-scale institutions, including governments, large NGOs, donor agencies, and international development agencies, that make decisions concerning the design of REDD and other interventions within the local arena. The intervening agents, however, are not all distant higher scale agencies. They are also those front line foresters and development workers who work for governments, development agencies and NGOs in the design and implementation of REDD and adaptation efforts. We will also call this ensemble of actors ‘decision makers’.

Institutional Choice in RFGI is defined as the identification by intervening agencies (such as central governments, international NGOs and development agencies) of the locus of decentralized authority, the local partner with whom intervening agencies work, and therefore to whom they transfer powers or provide support. Institutional choice can be inferred from observing the institutions with which intervening agencies have decided to work. The effect of choice is recognition (defined below). The term choice is used to attribute agency to these actors so that we can trace outcomes back to their decisions. With this tracing of the design and implementation of projects and laws back to their designers and promoters, the concept of choice enables us to target findings toward those responsible

for and capable of affecting change. We also use the term choice in distinction from its use in 'institutional choice' and 'public choice' economics. In our definition it is about agency of authorities who make decisions rather than assuming that governing decisions are an aggregate of individual choices articulated through governing actors.

LEGA (Local Environmental Governance Assessment) is the umbrella term that RFGI uses to describe the preliminary research conducted to assess the structure and effects of environmental governance in the arena of climate mitigation and adaptation interventions. The research is organized around two major parts, one if called 'choice' and the other called 'recognition'. Both are defined in this glossary. Both are developed in detail in this document.

Local is very difficult to define. In RFGI we will use the most local scales of sub-national government to define the 'local'. This is usually a sub-national jurisdiction of anywhere up to 50,000 people that is governed by a locally established authority – elected local government, customary authorities, warlords, etc. In most cases the 'local' will be defined empirically by a local institutional mapping. What people consider local will be partly subjective.

PES (Payments for Ecosystem Services) are voluntary, conditional transactions between suppliers and users of well-defined environmental services (Wunder and Albán 2008; Wunder 2005). Environmental services, or ecosystem services, are the benefits provided to people by ecosystems (Chan et al. accepted), such as timber, carbon sequestration and climate regulation in the case of forests. PES may involve environmental services directly, or land uses that can reasonably be expected to provide these services (Wunder and Albán 2008). Payments for ecosystem services require measurement of the services provided, in order that they can be quantified and sold. They also require some sort of guarantee from the land owners/users that the services which have been paid for will continue for a specified time into the future. These arrangements presume clear use or property rights that enable the buyer to know who is a legitimate seller.

The Public Domain consists of the resources and decisions under public control that are the basis for public decision making. The public domain is a domain of powers and knowledge that citizens may be able to influence. These powers and knowledge define the space of representative democracy in so far as they are the basis of responsiveness that makes an authority 'representative'. The public here is the population as a whole. Within the population those who can hold leaders to account vis-à-vis the exercise of public powers are called citizens. Those who cannot are subjects.

Recognition is the acknowledgement of another person, culture, or institution. The choice of local authorities or organizations by the government or by international agencies is a form of acknowledgement or recognition. Local institutions are recognized through the transfer of powers, partnering in projects, engagement by contracts, or via participation in dialogue and decision making. As an analytic concept, recognition helps us focus on the effects of the transfer of powers to, and backing of, select local institutions. See Ribot, Chhatre and Lankina, 2008.

REDD+ (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation) is defined by Angelsen et al. (2009:2 as cited in Sunderlin et al., 2010) "...an umbrella term for local, national and global actions that reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation, and enhance forest carbon stocks in developing countries (REDD+). The plus sign indicates enhancement of forest carbon stock, also referred to as forest regeneration and rehabilitation, negative degradation, negative emissions, carbon uptake, carbon removal or just removals. [Removals refer to sequestration of carbon from the atmosphere and storage in forest carbon pools.] ... REDD+ is shorthand for both a set of policies or actions that aim to reduce emissions and increase removals and for the final outcomes of those policies or actions (i.e. reduced emissions and increased removals)." For more discussion of REDD see Annex F and also see the forthcoming RFGI occasional papers by Anderson and Zerriffi and by Rutt.⁴

RFGI – The Responsive Forest Governance Initiative

Representation is made up of several basic elements: *Local leaders who are accountable to the people and who hold the powers to respond to their needs and aspirations.*

⁴ The most recent REDD+ guidelines that have been agreed to by the international community are articulated in Draft Decision 1 of the Sixteenth Conference of Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (Decision 1/CP.16.Add.1).

Subsidiarity is the idea that the best level for policy and procedural decisions is the most-local-possible level at which decisions are not likely to produce negative effects for higher scales of economic, social or political-administrative organization.

I. Research Handbook and Your Roles

This document provides a broad outline of RFGI research objectives and methods. These methods will be discussed, revised, developed further and tailored to the specific needs of each RFGI country at the RFGI Research Methods Meeting on the Island of Gorée off of Dakar, Senegal from 9-13 January 2012. Research teams and individual researchers should use this document as a guide to developing your own research protocols for presentation at the Research Methods Meeting. Each researcher will develop a revised research proposal based on your original successful proposal to RFGI, comments received from the RFGI team and this document. Individual researchers (those not part of a country team) will be expected to study in depth a part of the research agenda that is outlined in this document. You cannot cover everything. Select that portion that your case can best address. We also expect that you will then cover in less depth other major portions of the RFGI agenda. Your research should be focused but contextualized. If you chose to focus more on the politics of choice, then do it in great depth. We will then expect that you place this in the broader context of existing data and sufficient observation on the effects of recognition. Or, if you choose to spend your time in the field studying the effects of recognition, we expect that will be done in great depth and that you will then conduct less-in-depth but rigorous analysis of the issues of choice.

The core country RFGI research teams (in Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Ghana, Senegal and Uganda) will be expected to cover the whole RFGI research agenda, dividing the labor within your research teams to accomplish this. The country team leader will be responsible to develop a work plan that ensures complementarity among the case studies such that the RFGI agenda is fully addressed – all aspects of choice and of recognition. Each team member will still have an individual research proposal. The team leader in the core RFGI countries will also develop the necessary background material for the whole team (with help of the team). For the research methods meeting the team leader should present an overview of the state of Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD+) in your country, an overview of climate adaptation interventions, justification of the cases chosen for the team, justification of the roles of each team member, and a general work plan for their research team that ensures good complementarity among the individual studies. A suggested research proposal outline for each individual researcher is in Annex A.

Each RFGI researcher is expected to conduct research on the core RFGI research questions concerning the local-democracy effects of REDD and/or adaptation interventions. Each research is also expected to develop her or his own hypotheses to be explored along with the main RFGI questions. The research you conduct should be your own. It should reflect your deep interest and passion concerning the questions of the RFGI program and special areas of your own interest. While the RFGI program has a set of central questions concerning institutional choice and the effects of recognition on representation, citizenship and the public domain, the program makes room for you to concentrate on the area of most interest to you. The research you choose to engage in will have to keep your interest for the coming year and a half. You will be expected to conduct the research, write it up, revise it based on feedback from other

RFGI researchers and the RFGI core team, revise again and again (and again and again if need be) until your report is of international publishable quality for the CODESRIA-UIUC-IUCN occasional paper series. We will further expect you to revise your occasional papers into articles for international peer review journals. By the end of the RFGI research program we expect that each of you will have conducted and published global-quality research.

II. RFGI Presentation and Objectives

The Responsive Forest Governance Initiative (RFGI) is an Africa-wide comparative environmental-governance research and training Programme of CODESRIA, IUCN and UIUC. RFGI focuses on *Enabling Responsive and Accountable Decentralization*, in forestry to strengthen representation of forest-based rural populations within local-government decision making. We define democracy as government that is ‘responsive’ and ‘accountable’ to the people – thus, RFGI supports the emergence and consolidation of local democracy through and for forestry. RFGI aims to enhance and help institutionalize widespread responsive and accountable local governance processes that reduce vulnerability, enhance local wellbeing, and improve forest management. RFGI hopes to accomplish this by developing safeguards and guidelines to ensure fair and equitable implementation of climate mitigation and adaptation interventions. As its primary case study, RFGI will focus on Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+),⁵ which touches on both mitigation and adaptation concerns. Some of the RFGI studies may also explore rural climate-adaptation interventions.

REDD+ is a global program for disbursing funds, primarily to pay national government in developing countries, to reduce forest carbon emission (UN-REDD 2009:4). To be done well, REDD+ will require permanent local institutions that can integrate local needs with national and international objectives; although there remains a risk that REDD+ will impose national carbon sequestration requirements on local needs. Nations worldwide have introduced decentralization reforms aspiring to make local government responsive and accountable to citizen needs and aspirations so as to improve equity, service delivery and resource management. Natural resources, especially forests, play an important role in these decentralizations since they provide local governments and local people with needed revenue, wealth, and subsistence. Conversely, responsive local governments can provide resource-dependent populations the flexibility they need to manage, adapt to and remain resilient in their changing environment.

To date, however, environmental and natural resource management professionals from government and civil society have rarely capitalized on the functions of representative local government—including its institutional sustainability (or permanence) and full geographic coverage (for scaling up). These professionals often lack the technical and organizational skills to assess the potentials of democratic local government, to

⁵ The plus sign indicates inclusion of forest restoration, rehabilitation, sustainable management and/or afforestation and reforestation.

structure forestry decentralization to deliver equity and efficiency benefits, to meet implementation challenges, or to identify and take advantage of the opportunities democratic local government can offer. There are examples of success in many countries, yet decentralization in forestry remains far from achieving its promise.

Permanent representative local institutions will be necessary ingredients of any sustainable REDD+ and climate adaptation strategy. Drawing on new and existing decentralization research and experience, RFGI will identify pathways to implementing decentralization and strengthening the links between decentralization and locally responsive, accountable and pro-poor results. It will assess the conditions under which central authorities devolve significant forest management and use decisions to local government. And it will assess the conditions that enable local government to engage in sound forest management that supports poverty alleviation activities and investments. RFGI aims to enable local government to play its integrative role in rural development and natural resource management by serving as the institutional infrastructure for the scaling up of local participation in public decision making. The project also systematically trains young in-country policy researchers and analysts to help build an Africa-wide network of new-generation environmental-governance policy analysts.

RFGI will provide forestry decision makers and practitioners with a tested handbook for assessing, improving and monitoring the effects of forestry policies and projects on local responsiveness and accountability of forest-governance institutions by: a) identifying the elements of responsive and accountable local decision-making institutions, b) developing indicators (measurable variables) for the presence and quality of each of those elements, c) providing methods for measuring these indicators, and d) providing guidelines for indicator measurement and for their use in assessing and designing interventions.

The resulting Responsive Forest Governance Handbook (RFG Handbook), composed of these indicators and guidelines for indicator measurement, data analysis and policy design, should leverage forestry decisions that are more-systematically beneficial to local communities, are pro-poor, and counterbalance the common biases that exclude women, minorities, and migrants. The RFG Handbook aims to enable practitioners and policy analysts to ensure that policies and projects support responsive and accountable local forestry decision-making processes. RFGI will test the ease of use of the RFG Handbook indicators and guidelines and their effectiveness in a variety of countries. A Community Monitoring Handbook (CM Handbook) will be developed to accompany the RFG Handbook so communities can evaluate and learn from policy-making and implementation processes. RFGI will hone the RFG and CM Handbooks for wide diffusion and use.

RFGI will work in ten African countries over five years. Phase I is three years of in-depth field-based policy research and analysis that will be used for development and testing of the RFG and CM Handbooks. Phase II is two years for completing and fine tuning, learning from practice, diffusion of the RFG Handbook Set for use by front-line forest management practitioners. Phase I of RFGI will assess the democracy effects of REDD

through Local Environmental Governance Assessments (LEGAs) – these are the studies of ‘choice’ and ‘recognition’ outlined in this document.

This document presents the research guidelines for phase I LEGAs. The LEGAs will focus on the effects of REDD on rural representation. The research will describe and explain: 1) the current state of rural representation in forestry, 2) the ways REDD interventions support or undermine that rural representation, and 3) the effects of rural representation on REDD practice and outcomes. Emphasis will be on the first two items. LEGAs will 1) produce the basic data needed to design a Responsive Forest Governance (RFG) Handbook, and 2) provide a baseline measure against which to test how well practitioners are able to assess local forest governance using the RFG Handbook.

III. The Object of Study – REDD and Adaptation

Because REDD+ has barely begun implementation, the RFGI program will study existing projects and policies that are gearing up for REDD implementation or that share elements with expected REDD interventions, such as carbon trading schemes and other Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES) projects or programs in forestry. Some of what is unique about REDD is outlined in Annex F. REDD is largely a market-based program in so far as one entity (government) pays another (government or private/non-government) to achieve carbon storage. Therefore one of its important characteristics will be the development of schemes to pay for and trade natural resources as conservation values. This is why REDD-like interventions include PES and carbon trading programs. RFGI wants to capture in its analysis the effects of these market-based approaches on rural representation.

A few RFGI researchers may also choose to focus on climate adaptation interventions. These are much more like standard development programs. Many will already be underway. Many will be projects that existed for a long time that have been relabeled adaptation. The object here will be, like in the study of REDD interventions, how donors, governments and development agencies – via their laws and projects – understand and execute representation supporting activities in their interventions. RFGI would like a few cases focused on these non-market interventions for comparative purposes. Hence RFGI will limit our focus on adaptation interventions to a few adaptation studies among the mix of cases taken up. There is a lot to be learned about support for representation from these other climate-action programs.

This document will specify REDD as the focus of our research and analysis. From here on the document will only mention adaptation in passing. REDD is the main focus of RFGI. The research on choice and recognition can just as easily apply to adaptation as to REDD. Hence, these guidelines are equally applicable to both.

IV. Defining Democracy & Representation

This section outlines the theoretical basis of the research framework. It begins defining important terms (also see glossary) through a discussion of a policy model of

representation. The next section then introduces the choice and recognition framework that will be used to organize the research.


A. Democracy, Representation and Outcomes – a policy model of representation

Democratic accountability is the ability of people to sanction leaders. Representation is at the heart of modern democracies and occurs when leaders are responsive to their people and the people under their jurisdiction are able to hold them to account (Manin, Stokes and Przeworski 1999). RFGI focuses on local representation, which, based on the above definition, is made up of several basic elements: Local leaders who are accountable to the people and who hold the powers to respond to people's needs and aspirations.

For RFGI we will use a basic policy model of representation (following Manin, Przeworski and Stokes's 1999) to understand the relations between authority and local populations as shaped by REDD. In this model, representation is the heart of a positive cyclical policy process linking citizens to government (or any authority that governs) via accountability and response. Representation in policy requires voice and sanction—the means of accountability—that can guide and discipline strong, capable and responsive government. *Accountability* and *responsiveness* are the building blocks of democratic representation from which good government and/or good governance follow (Manin, Przeworski and Stokes 1999:2).⁶

A government (or any other authority) is representative when it is responsive and/or accountable to its citizens. Manin, Przeworski, and Stokes (1999:2) write, "A government is 'responsive' if it adopts policies that are signaled as preferred by citizens....Governments are 'accountable' if citizens can sanction them appropriately..." In the policy process, preferences expressed through various signals (regarding citizen views, perspectives, interests, needs) become mandates and are translated by government officials into policies and then outcomes that generate a new set of citizen judgments and preferences (Figure 1). In this respect, responsiveness is the translation of signals into policies, and accountability is the link between outcomes and sanctions. Accountability is manifested in the ability of citizens to monitor and sanction decisions and actions deemed undesirable (Manin, Przeworski and Stokes 1999:2). Responsiveness requires *powers* and *abilities* that enable authorities to respond and translate signals into policies (also see Crook and Sverrisson 2001; Overdevest 2000). Note that responsiveness includes the whole gamut of bureaucracy and the power of government to hold bureaucracy accountable to it (see Yilmaz et al. 2011 for more on bureaucratic accountability relations).

⁶ In common usage, increasing accountability usually refers to efforts that codify moral claims into law or efforts to bring de facto accountability closer to de jure ideals. These efforts aim to produce more just law and to assure that law is applied. These are efforts to enable less powerful actors who hold certain rights to place checks on more powerful actors whose actions affect them. In common usage, then Goetz and Jenkins (2005:11) point out that accountability is usually a shorthand for 'democratic accountability', which refers to accountability to the people and to the legal framework. (See Goetz and Jenkins 2005:10-11.)



Accountability is a relation in which one actor or group of actors is able to keep the power of another in check – as such it is counter power (Agrawal and Ribot 1999). It is typically broken into: 1) *answerability* or the obligation one party to explain and justify actions to another; and 2) *enforcement* or the ability of one party to sanction the other when the explanations are found inadequate (Brinkerhoff 2001:2-3; Ackerman 2003:448; Goetz and Jenkins 2005:8; Bovens 2006:9). Goetz and Jenkins (2005:8) remark that accountability then is “as much about public debate and discussion as it is the sheer imposition of will” and that answerability and enforcement are its necessary components—with neither being sufficient alone. Answerability is composed of explanation and information.⁷ Enforcement is constituted through positive and negative sanctions (Przworski, Stokes and Manin 1999).

Accountability is an important defining element of political systems (Agrawal and Ribot 1999). Different systems of rule are distinguished by the forms of accountability at work. Those that are accountable to their people can be called democratic or representative. Those that are not can fall under a number of different categories – benign dictatorship, fascist, autocratic, totalitarian, etc. Democracy is made by specific kinds of accountability relations. Accountability is the mechanism that links citizens to state and creates the forum for expression of local views and contestation of state actions. Accountability of government to the people then is the mechanism that enables these roles of representation in matters of equity. Of course, without powers, accountable authorities can do little. So, again, it is this combination of accountability and power that enable response that makes a regime representative – and therefore

⁷ Information is the evidentiary basis of explanation, which limits the possible range of rationality. It is the requirement to provide the data on which a decision is justified (Goetz and Jenkins 2005:8).

capable of addressing and shaping issue of equality and equity (although they many not necessarily do so).⁸

In sum, when studying the effects of REDD on representation we will need to focus in on 1) which authorities are present in the local arena and which hold powers over resources from or relevant to REDD, 2) what accountability mechanisms are in place to be exercised toward the responsiveness of these authorities, 3) what powers these authorities hold in order to be able to respond to demands when held to account, and 4) what powers (knowledge and means) citizens (or subjects, *a la* Mamdani 1996, where they hold no powers) have in order to engage in holding leaders to account. The RFGI program will examine how these variables (authorities, rules/procedures and distribution of powers/resources) are configured before REDD, changed by REDD, and configured after REDD interventions.

V. Defining Choice and Recognition

REDD interventions constitute a set of policies that are designed in the international arena and adopted by nation states. REDD policies are also taken up and promoted by donors and international NGOs. These policies can take many forms. RFGI will focus on the payments for ecosystem services aimed at management of forests to sequester carbon. As governments, large NGOs and international development agencies translate these policies into practice, they make a number of choices relevant to local representation. They chose which powers will be located with local authorities and they choose which local authorities will be empowered to make REDD related decisions – whether for their own good or on behalf of the local population. These choices are a large part of what constitutes the design and subsequently the effects of REDD – and other payments for ecosystem services (PES). The decisions taken by intervening agencies are a large part of the policy story. Hence, RFGI’s focus on choice. Choice constitutes a ‘recognition’ of local actors. The institutions empowered by these choices are considered to be ‘recognized’ by being empowered by and partnered with donors, NGOs and governments. The RFGI program will study both the choices made and the effects of the recognitions they produce on local democracy.

A. Defining Choice

REDD is a set of policies – decisions by powerful actors within the REDD establishment that change the nature and distribution of rules and powers over forest-related resources.⁹ RFGI is about REDD policy decisions and their effects on representation. We call these decisions ‘choice’. Once a policy choice has been made then it changes powers among actors by shifting who can make decisions and who can benefit. The

⁸ Note that Crook and Sverrisson (2001) argue that elected local governments do not attend to the needs of the poorest unless mandated to by higher levels of government. Equity as an outcome of representative authority cannot be assumed but has to be observed.

⁹ We define forest-related resources broadly as including pasture, land, habitat, trees, subsistence and market products, shade, timber, non-timber forest products, jobs in forest management, jobs in forestry departments, jobs in forestry markets, famine fallback resources, access to finance, access to project benefits, hiding places for rebels, sacred spaces, etc.

policy makers choose local actors through which to engage and the powers they will hold. Such choice is an act of recognition, recognition has effects (see Ribot, Chhatre and Lankina 2008).

‘We are interested in why and how intervening agencies (governments, development agencies and large-NGOs) make policy and programmatic decisions. As these higher-level agencies make policies and design projects, they do so with objectives in mind and assumptions about how to operationalize those objectives – to use the instruments at their disposal to turn them into action. Intervening agents objectives usually include support for local participation¹⁰ or democracy/representation. The core objective in studying ‘choice’ is to understand how representation is being understood and operationalized by intervening agents. What is the logic by which they translate their objectives into policies practices? By understanding this logic we can later help intervening agents to improve their project and policy design and implementation.

To understand ‘choice’ we need to start by observing what choices are being made. Who do these policies and projects choose to empower and how? What local institutions do they choose as their interlocutors? To which groups and individuals do they transfer resources and rights or advocate that resources and rights be transferred to? The second step is to understand why they make these choices. Is participation or representation even part of their thinking? Where does it come in – as an essential element or afterthought? What are the models and assumptions of the policy makers and policy designers as they develop their policies and projects? How do they understand democracy and participation? What do they think are the essential elements that need to be put in place or strengthened to establish democracy and participation? How do they view accountability? Do their assumptions lead them to design policies and projects that are likely to support durable local representation and significant participation? Choice research will explain the choice by state and non-state actors of local institutions to empower and the powers they choose to give them.

B. Defining Recognition

‘Recognition’ concerns the effects of policy and project choices on local democracy. Recognition is what choices do on the ground. Once chosen, via partnering, empowerment, engagement, or contracting, a local institution is recognized. We are interested in the effects of this recognition on representation. First, we need to characterize what recognition is – what powers are transferred to whom, what changes in law and practice take place. Second we need to understand the effects of these changes on the three principal elements of democratic practice: representation, citizenship and the public domain. Do they reinforce representative local institutions and practices, do they inspire or enable local people to engage as citizens, and do they

¹⁰¹⁰ It is important to analyze how intervening agents understand participation. Participation is often thought of as a form of representation, however, it rarely amounts to representation. Representation and participation should not be conflated. See Ribot 1996.

provide local leaders the necessary powers so that there is a domain of public decision making that is appropriate, sufficient and meaningful enough to engage a democratic process. Do they provide local people with the basic capabilities (*a la* Sen and Nussbaum 1993; McDermott, Mohanty and Schrekenberg 2011:9) to be able to engage as citizens?

The ‘politics of recognition’ literature (*a la* Taylor 1994) provides a means for exploring moments where one actor recognizes another through transfers of some form of power to that authority or individual. The relation does not just affect the binary relation between the higher-level actors and sub-national authorities. The state, donor or international NGO recognizes and is recognized by the local actors they seek to partner with or empower—in a kind of ‘contract’ that links authority and authority (cf Sikor and Lund 2009:1). That act of mutual recognition and the sharing or transfer of power—or even the harnessing of these actors as extensions of the state, donor or international agencies—subsequently reshapes the relation between the empowered actors and the populations with which they interact or which they dominate or rule (e.g. the ‘dual mandate’ of Lugard 1926; Chanock 1991). There is a cascading recognition effect when higher-level institutions recognize more-local bodies transforming their relations with local actors.ⁱ

States, national, and international institutions are constantly engaged in recognizing new and existing authorities around the world—creating, strengthening and weakening them. In the process, they are producing and destroying different forms of authority and those authorities’ reign over their constituent populations. Such recognition is at the heart of reforms called ‘decentralization’ and of all other interventions by higher level actors with authorities in the local arena. The recognition literature provides some insights into the effects of choices on the authorities they recognize.

To leverage insights from the literature on recognition, this research framework shifts the focus of the recognition debates in two ways: 1) from the recognition of *culture* and *identities* to the recognition of *authority*, and 2) from Taylor’s view of recognition as enfranchisement to a more ambiguous view of recognition having positive and negative consequences for democracy.ⁱⁱ We find that critiques of Taylor’s concept of recognitionⁱⁱⁱ by Fraser (2000), Tully (2000), Markell (2000), and Povinelli (2002) shed light on the enfranchising and disenfranchising effects of recognizing different kinds of authorities. The recognition literature provides conceptual tools for analyzing the production of democratic local authority under democracy ‘decentralization’ reforms (see Ribot 2011 and Ribot, Chhatre and Lankina 2008 for more details).

In short, we see from the recognition literature that when a body is recognized to represent local cultures or identities, that body becomes an authority. But, that body will only reflect one, sometimes narrow, interpretation of the whole group. Hence, by choosing an authority to represent a particular marginalized ethnic, indigenous, or racial group, that authority can then create a definition of that group, defining belonging and exclusion, defining authentic and inauthentic, and so creating new forms of inclusion and exclusion. The empowerment of an authority to promote that

group can then reify an identity of the group and in so doing create new injustices. (See for example Povinelli 2002.) Hence, recognition risks narrowing belonging if it does not attend to issues of broad representation. Further, recognition can reshape belonging and exclusion. Insights of this nature are behind the use of a recognition approach in this program.

We use the concept of ‘recognition’ to better understand the effects of the chosen mix of local authorities, and the mix of powers transferred to them, on representation, citizenship (or belonging more broadly), and the public domain (the powers that are held publically). Recognition of different forms of local authority implies different development and equity outcomes. *Knowing why* particular choices are being made helps to relate the outcomes associated with choices back to—to interrogate and influence—the project and policy design process. *Understanding their effects* helps to identify approaches most likely to strengthen local democracy while serving the needs of local people and broader developmental objectives.

VI. Literature Review and Institutional Mapping

All good research begins with knowledge of what has come before. A good place to start is a review of the existing scholarship. You should all be thoroughly reading the theoretical and case-based research on the topics of representation, citizenship, rights, forest management, REDD and areas where insights from past research can help guide your research. You should read and review the literature on your case area, including ethnographic and sociological studies of your site, and geographical, ecological, forestry, and agricultural analyses of your area. You should read published materials and documents. You should get to know the laws that structure rules of access and use of natural resources and that shape the institutional environment you are analyzing. A suggested outline for your literature review is presented in Annex B.

An essential background step for RFGI research is to identify the institutional landscape you will be studying. You must identify which intervening agencies matter, what local institutions are involved in resource management and use, and what powers they exercise. This is an institutional mapping that must also be done through the literature and through a review of laws in advance of your field research. Details on institutional mapping are outlined in Annex C. The literature can include the institutional mapping as one of its chapters.

RFGI will make available to you any literature you might require for your research. We have access to almost all journals and books from almost all times and places and languages – including documents on your own country and field site. If need be we can obtain them for you. You should first try to find them locally. You will also be able to find some materials through the CODESRIA library. If you cannot locate any item, please contact Emmanuel Nuesiri at enuesiri@gmail.com. He has access to a massive library system and can obtain materials you need. You will have no excuse for missing any literature in your search. Access to in-country project documents and laws will usually be available to you locally. We will not be as able to help you with this material.

VII. Researching Choice and Recognition

In the two sections below, methods for studying the choice and recognition elements of the RFGI research program are developed. These basic research questions provide a foundation on which to develop the many parallel and additional research questions that each researcher should bring to her or his research within RFGI. These are the questions that will be used for the comparative portion of the RFGI program. This document develops the basic research questions to be posed and outlines the methods to be employed.

A. Study of 'Choice'

This project first examines the logic behind institutional choices made by intervening agents. It also studies the effects on local democracy of choosing, and therefore 'recognizing', different kinds of local authorities under what are called 'decentralization reforms'. Governments and international organizations manifest their choice of local authorities by transferring powers to them, conducting joint activities or soliciting their input. Through their choices, they are transforming the local institutional landscape. Hence, the study of choice will involve understanding why these central bodies pick certain local actors as their interlocutors and why they choose to transfer some powers and responsibilities to them and not others.

We want to understand how the actors who design policies and projects take local representation into account. This means understanding 1) whether representation or participation is a priority for them, 2) how they define representation and related (and often substituted) concepts such as participation, 3) what measures or acts they believe are necessary to create representation, and 4) how – that is through what specific measures – they translate their understanding into actual directives in policy or projects. We will take each of these issues up in turn.

The study of choice takes place via analysis of laws, program and project documents, and interviews of actors in central government, donor and large NGO offices. This is a matter of 'studying up' – when anthropologists or sociologists study highly educated and aware subjects and can be different from conducting interviews in village societies or institutions (Nader 1974). Choices can later be re-examined through research in affected areas where the actual practices can be compared with what central actors believe themselves to be doing and the ways in which they understand their own actions.

Your 'studying up' approach to choice will have to be flexible. You will have to enter the interviews knowing what you want to understand and you must then conduct your interviews following the circumstance of each encounter. You will have to give the subjects confidence, make them understand your objectives in a way that is not threatening to the subjects. This means you need to think very carefully of how you present yourself and the project, and how you develop your questions. In turn, this requires you to know the entire terrain of concepts that are sought to be measured through these interviews and surveys. Which is why reading this entire handbook, as

opposed to only the parts explicitly discussing the survey instrument is extremely important. Further, you should read the literature cited in this handbook. Key readings will be available on the RFGI shared secured web link.

1. Is representation a priority for intervening agents?

The data to help answer this question must be derived from a) discourse (what intervening agents say and write), and b) codification (how they integrate elements of representation into their policies and projects).

To get at discourse, you must interview policy makers and project designers as well as project practitioners. As you conduct interviews, ask at each step how they define their terms and what they think must be done to accomplish the outcome they are aiming at. If/when they talk of representation or participation, ask them to define what they mean by these terms. Be very specific. To do this correctly, you must be aware of the range of definitions that are in use. You want to learn in this interview if they have an explicit theory of representation or participation, if they know existing theories, or if they have just an implicit theory. You will need to investigate how they think and how they translate their thoughts into practice. Exactly what elements must be in place for there to be effective representation or participation? Ask them to distinguish between the two as well. Are they trying to accomplish one versus the other? What must be established for these to come into existence in their policy arena or project area?

Some practical considerations in the study of intervening agents priorities include:

- Keep in mind that many intervening agents will conflate participation with representation. They are not the same. Political representation, which we are talking of, is about leaders being accountable and responsive to citizens. Representation is a form of participation, but participation is a much broader concept including many non-representative, non-democratic engagements. Participation often includes many activities that simply engage local people in outside agendas by integrating them into project activities. Participation also often includes forums in which local voices are heard. But their voices are not binding in decision making. Such forms do not amount to representation, they are more akin to colonial privy councils on which local elites shared their concerns with the colonial officers. The colonial officers then made decisions. You must go to your interviews with a clear understanding of representation and of the range of meanings of participation in order to be able to evaluate what your interviewees mean by these terms. Do not assume they have the same understanding as you do. Interrogate deeper to find out how they define their terms and what they think are the working parts in translating these terms into practices. Further, since participation is more likely to be what projects aim to accomplish, it is still important for us to understand what is done in the name of participation – to understand whether or not what is being done can be called representation.
- Come to the interview knowing as much of the policy or project documentation that is available. Come to the interview with knowledge of the local institutional landscape and the local actors. At the interview obtain

additional documentation if it is available. The interviews of intervening agents or decision makers should be done after you have done your review of documentation and have had at least one or two reconnaissance trips to your field sites.

- Interviewers must not ask directly about representation or participation until the end of the interview – unless the interviewee brings it up. It is critical not to ask ‘leading questions’ (questions that push the interviewee to give you the answers they think you are looking for).
- To establish where representation and participation fall in their priorities, ask them to list the full range of environmental and social outcomes (intermediary and final) that they are aiming to accomplish. Observe whether and where representation falls in this discussion.
- To understand the importance of representation and participation, ask the interviewee what elements of the program are essential and which are less critical.
- Once representation or participation is mentioned by the interviewee ask:
 - How important these are for their policies or projects,
 - Why they have included representation and/or participation in their projects,
 - What functions representation or participation serve in the project. Be careful to understand exactly what your interviewee thinks having forms of inclusion (representation or participation) does for the project, for the population, for the sustainability of the intervention, etc. The key here is to walk away understanding why they include participation in their project and what they think it accomplishes.
- How do representation and participation result in the outcomes they describe – get them to be very specific about what institutions, practices, relations, policies, mechanisms, etc. lead to what outcomes and exactly how they do so.
- How do they see resource degradation being related to representation or participation?

2. How do intervening agents define representation and participation?

- Once the issue of representation or participation emerges in the discussion, ask about how they define it and what its elements are. Interrogate their awareness of theories of representation and participation.
- If they use terms like democracy, representation, participation, accountability, citizenship, belonging, responsibility, *responsibilization* (a francophone term), decentralization, democratic decentralization, deconcentration, ask how they define these terms.
- Ask about which institutions represent the local population and how well they do so.
- Ask *how* each institution that they think represents local people operates and *how*, through what means, it represents local people.
- For an institution to be representative, ask if there are any special requirements. What does it need in order to be representative?

- Are representative institutions decision making bodies or are they bodies that communicate local needs and aspirations to others?
- To whom do local representative institutions represent local people?
- Can representation occur without these institutions holding decision making powers?
- What kinds of decisions should representative institutions make? What kinds of decisions should they not be making?
- To whom should participatory or representative bodies be accountable and through what accountability mechanisms?

3. What measures or acts do intervening agents believe are necessary to create representation or participation?

- To design representation into their policies or projects, what do they believe must be included in their policies and projects?
 - What are the working parts of effective representation?
 - What does a local actor need in order to be representative?
 - What kinds of institutions, mechanisms or power transfers need to be established for effective representation to take place?
 - How do these mechanisms and institutions lead to representation?
 - Which of these mechanisms can be done without while still maintaining representation? Which are essential?

And/or

- To design participation into their policies or projects, what do they believe must be included in their policies and projects?
 - What are the working parts of effective participation?
 - What kinds of institutions, mechanisms or power transfers need to be established for effective participation to take place?
 - How do these mechanisms operate so as to lead to participation?
 - Which mechanisms or institutions can be done without while still having effective participation? Which are essential?

4. Through what specific measures do they translate their understanding into actual directives in policy or projects?

- What are they actually doing to support representation or participation?
 - Describe the specific policies or actions
 - Explain how they work.
- Are their efforts to support representation and/or participation problematic?
 - What problems have they run into?
 - Do they think these efforts are worthwhile?
 - How did they work in practice? How were they designed, implemented, received?
 - Were they effective? How do they know they were effective? What kinds of indicators do they have or studies have they done?

The above outline of required data on 'choice' is suggestive. It is not a list of research questions or the outline for a questionnaire. Interview guidelines and questionnaires (if questionnaires are appropriate in your case) need to be designed for each institution, and each intervening actor, that you are querying in each country.

At the end of an interview with an intervening agent, it will be important to establish the interviewee's background in participation, representation, or democracy and governance. Do they or have they ever worked in a project on participation, representation or democracy? Have they had trainings in these areas? Did they study these issues when they were at the university? How have they learned about participation, representation, and democracy in their education and work experiences? This information is helpful for contextualizing their answers.

5. Choice Research Procedure

The study of choice will be conducted in two parts. All individual researchers in all RFGI countries (whether you are a lone researcher in your country or part of a team) will be required to carry out an analysis of choice as specified in part one below. For the full country research teams, part 2 will also be required.

1. Each researcher should conduct an analysis of 'choice' with respect to the specific policies s/he is analyzing in her or his LEGA. This study should take place at the end of the LEGA research (although some questions can be asked up front while conducting the background country literature review). Specific questions on 'choice' should be developed for the LEGA researchers by the person conducting the stand-alone study below.
2. A stand-alone study in each core country (each country with a full research team) should be conducted that cuts across the institutions intervening in REDD and other REDD like forestry interventions. This study should be conducted by someone not conducting the LEGA research starting at the beginning of the LEGA research process. This study should require approximately three weeks in each country. For this study, a senior researcher will be needed to conduct the cross-cutting stand-alone study in each country, in a selection of RFGI countries, or even across all RFGI study countries. It is important that this researcher be senior since the nature of studying up requires easy access to high-level actors and requires someone with the skills to put policy makers and project designers within international and national governments and organizations at ease.

B. Study of Recognition

1. Measuring Recognition

By being chosen through being partnered with or empowered, a local institution is recognized. Recognition is quantified through the actual powers (decisions, resources, skills, etc.) transferred and the institutions to which they are transferred. It can be analyzed and evaluated by examining the actual practices under the REDD or PES policies and projects under study. Who is doing what with whom? What powers are

transferred to whom? Are these discretionary powers? Are they sufficient power for the authorities to actually be responsive to local demands? Are they meaningful powers to the local population? Are the transfers conditional or secure? Are the transfers to representative authorities or other parallel authorities? Are there new processes or means by which local populations can hold their leaders accountable?

Measuring recognition is a matter of analyzing the changes in institutional relations and in the distribution of powers brought by new laws and interactions (see Annex F on What is REDD and What does it Do). It has two primary components. The first is to analyze changes in rules and transfers of powers. The second is to interview actors and devise other measures to assess the degree to which these rules and transfers are effective—the degree to which they are taking place in practice. These interviews and measures will also assess the non-written rules applied alongside of the written ones that either enable or disable the exercise of new rights and powers.

2. Measuring effects of recognition

Recognition shapes three elements of local democracy: **representation**, **citizenship**, and the **public domain**. Representation in turn is composed of accountability and responsiveness (Manin, Przewski and Stokkes 1999). Accountability is constituted of counter powers (Agrawal and Ribot 1999) but involves both communication and sanction – and of course the power/capabilities to engage in these activities. Responsiveness concerns the way in which recognized authorities respond to and meet the needs and aspirations of the population. Citizenship is the ability of people to influence those who govern them. The public domain is the ensemble of powers that are held by a public authority.

Understanding the effects of recognition on these elements of democracy will require a series of questionnaires that are targeted at the local authorities and at local populations. These will need to either have a before and after recognition (inter-temporal) component or will have to be applied to compare areas where recognition has occurred with areas where it has not occurred (cross-sectional - with as much control for other sources of variation as possible).

3. Measuring REDD Effects on Representation

Through institutional choices, REDD will shape representation by changing local institutions, the powers they hold and the accountabilities they are subject to. It may also affect representation by changing various rules of resource access and use that create new lines of conflict or cooperation that inspire or require people's engagement with government. This engagement will throw into relief the existing or changed landscape of representation as people's demands are met or thwarted. In this sense REDD effects on representation should be studied through 1) an analysis of REDD effects on the institutional landscape, and 2) through an analysis of actual cases of demand, conflict or redress occurring in the context of REDD and REDD-like interventions.

Measuring changes in representation will first require identifying the landscape of local authorities – which authorities are acting and hold powers in arenas touched by REDD and other interventions. This is done through an Institutional Mapping to be conducted as part of your literature review and supplemented with grounded observation. Detailed discussion of institutional mapping is found in Annex C.

The second aspect of studying changes in representation evaluating changes in the responsiveness and accountability of local authorities. The analysis of responsiveness involves an analysis of the means of response, while evaluating accountability requires an analysis of the available and exercised accountability mechanisms.

In complement to this method, changes representation can be evaluated by analysis of the evolution of correspondence between decisions being taken locally and local needs and aspirations.¹¹

iii. Representation: Responsiveness and Accountability

Democratic representation is composed of responsiveness with accountability. Responsiveness requires the ability to respond or the powers – resources and skills to hear, understand, synthesize, translate into mandates, hammer into policies, and to respond to demands. Accountability is the motive for this response: positive and negative sanctions that discipline authorities to respond.

Powers: The Ability to Respond

An analysis of responsiveness first involves an analysis of the powers of the local authorities to act. What powers do the authorities you have identified in the institutional mapping hold – executive (decision making and implementation), legislative (rule making) and judicial (dispute resolution). Are these powers sufficient to accomplish potential goals with respect to valued outcomes – such as resource management and use or vulnerability reduction in the case of climate change response? Are the powers held by these authorities the kinds of powers that people under their jurisdiction value – that is are they significant enough to motivate local people to act in order to influence the exercise of these powers? Are the powers discretionary – that is are these powers earmarked so that the authority in question is just implementing a higher command or are they powers that the authority in question can exercise freely?

The power to act or respond is constituted by many factors –material and discursive. It can be useful to analyze this power to act with respect to skills and knowledge, social relations, and material resources such as finance, the territory or land or forests over which local authorities have jurisdiction, authority to allocate access to resources in their domain, ability to mobilize people (experts or labor), ability to mobilize higher

¹¹ Please also consult the forthcoming RFGI working paper by Prakash Kashwan for a broad discussion of means of framing and measuring representation. It is also highly recommended that you read Manin, Bernard, Adam Przeworski, and Susan Stokes, 1999.

levels of the state – to obtain experts, bulldozers, funding, influence legislation, etc. Be certain to be specific about how you characterize powers. What are people able to do. What are they allowed to do by law and what do they have the means to do in practice.

When powers are held by local authorities, it is also important to assess the security with which they hold those powers. If the powers are transferred to them conditionally, this will produce accountability to those transferring the powers. If they are transferred definitively, then the authority can exercise them more freely. It is important to evaluate through interviews and through examination of the laws involved whether the local authorities have a secure grasp on the powers they exercise. The means of transfer matters. If the powers are transferred via a constitution or constitutional amendment or via national legislation, they are usually relatively secure. When transferred by decree or administrative order, they are less secure.

The powers under the jurisdiction of a local authority constitute the ‘public domain’ when that authority is a public authority. This is the domain over which democratic processes have jurisdiction. It is the set of powers that make it worthwhile for local people to act as citizens within processes aimed at influencing the state.

To measure the shape of the public domain requires both an understanding of the legal and political administrative laws and regulations that enable and constrain public action and an evaluation of practice. Observation of practice will reveal a broad array of constraints that shape and reshape the local public domain – such as party politics, local norms and values, the powers of parallel local authorities, etc.

Accountability

Accountability is also a form of power. It is the counter-power that balances the exercise of power of any given authority. There are multiple mechanisms of accountability – just as there are multiple forms of power and ways of exercising power. Accountability is exercised through a wide variety of mechanisms. These include elections, public meetings, public reporting requirements, recall, magic, protest, third-party monitoring, etc. Some of these are described in Annex E.

An analysis of accountability is an analysis of 1) the legal means of sanctioning authorities, and 2) the practice of sanctioning. The researchers must examine acts of authority and the reactions that people have to them. This can be done by interviewing people about past acts and asking them if they were or were not happy with these acts and if they did anything about it. It can also be achieved by examining the nature of participation in events/moments during which authorities are held to account (such as elections or protests or public meetings) and by examining the character of public debate during such moments (what for example are the newspapers and media saying?).

The analysis of how REDD and other climate interventions shape accountability is partly based on the analysis of changes in laws that inform us of changes in powers of

different authorities. But to characterize the means that local people have to exercise counter-power requires observing of changes in their actions (exercise of powers) and an attempt to trace from these instances what factors enabled sanctioning to take place. This ability may change with REDD and with other climate interventions as people may have more wealth to act, they may have more acts of government against which to act, they may see government as having more revenues that make it worth influencing government, they may have new mechanisms through which to exercise counter power.

Correspondence between Decisions and Needs/Aspirations – Measuring Representation as Outcome

To this point the analysis of representation is based on process tracing and ethnographic participant observation – observing the relation between action and accountability. Representation can also be analyzed through correlation. Political scientists tend to measure representation by correlating expressed needs and aspirations with policy decisions and policy outcomes. These can be assessed through surveys of needs and aspirations and observations of the degree to which policy responses match those needs and aspirations. This relation can also be examined by polling local people to see if they feel their needs and aspirations are being met. Correlation and statistics relating needs and aspirations to policy responses and outcomes will not give us a fine-grained sociological analysis that RFGI aims at, but it can complement our more ethnographic analysis to give us a more robust set of findings.

Some of the basic questions that must be asked to understand relations of representation are:

- **Do people feel that their leaders are worth influencing?**
- **Do they feel they can influence them?**
- Do leaders know what people want?
 - You must measure needs and aspirations.
 - You must interview leaders to see what they understand local needs and aspirations to be.
- Do decisions reflect people's needs and aspirations?
 - You must observe decisions and compare them to what people say they need and want.
 - What decisions are being made?
 - Do people like what leaders are doing (and do they understand the context – i.e. resources and skills and laws – and limits under which they do them)?
 - What leaders say they are trying to achieve and are they are trying to respond to people's needs and aspirations.
- Explaining this relation or lack of relation
 - Explain why leaders do or do not know what people need and want
 - Interview leaders and interview people to understand their relation

- Explain why leaders do or do not respond to what people need and want
 - Evaluate conditions that enable or constrain decisions from reflecting needs and aspirations (knowledge, powers, accountabilities)?
- Why did any instance of responsiveness occur?
- Who asked, who responded and why?
- To what degree are services that people are happy with services that were asked for?
- To what degree are they services that just arrived?
- Were there services that people preferred?

Taking a quantitative approach to these issues can be helpful. The sequence of causal mechanisms that are involved in the entire gamut of representation issues in the choice and recognition framework are as follows. Citizen interests/preferences LEAD TO signals/mandate LEADING TO responsiveness (through policy measures) RESULTING IN policy outcomes WHICH INSPIRE citizens' assessment of whether the outcomes are satisfactory WHICH RESULT IN accountability acts that express citizen preferences (positive or negative assessment of measures).

To design empirical tools, as well as to enable the RFGI researchers to grapple with the overwhelmingly complex theoretical terrain relevant to this research and presented in the schematic diagram above, it is important to break the theoretical framework into different components of an empirical research framework.

Let us consider an example – say, our interest in understanding and analyzing the institutional choices made by policy elites at the national level. Therefore, the choices made by policy elites are our dependent variable. Within the small set of questions aimed at understanding the institutional choices made by policy elites, we should include the questions that trace all of the factors affecting elites' policy choices (all of these factors constitute the independent variables). Now, this particular case might not be a suitable candidate for quantitative analysis, but thinking in terms of dependent and independent variables can help you stay focused on the core question that is being addressed.

Moving from choice to recognition, if we are interested in how institutional choices that have been made affect democracy outcome, then the choices become the independent variable. They are the act of recognition. The democracy outcomes – representation, citizenship, a public domain – are the dependent variables. We need to then be clear on the effects of recognition of different institutions on these outcomes.

For example, as part of our analysis of representation we are interested in how recognition by an external body affects the legitimacy of a given institution and citizen confidence in it. Confidence in an institution will affect expectations of that institution and the kinds of demands made and accountability measures exercised. How an institution is recognized may also affect how leaders within it respond to local

demands and whether they respond to reflect the needs of those who recognized them or those who they ostensibly serve. These questions require us to think of legitimacy and confidence as a dependent variable and therefore require us to have a measure or proxy for characterizing legitimacy and confidence. This outcome (effects on legitimacy of local authority) might be amenable to survey research, which would of course need to be supplemented with qualitative ethnographic inquiry into the local authority relations and so forth.

While the quantitative part of these research protocols remains incomplete. Survey instruments to characterize the effects of recognition will be developed by the RFGI core team and the researchers in the first month of the RFGI program. These instruments will have to be tailored to each country's situation and each researcher's case study. You should in your own research proposals be developing a clear outline of your independent and dependent variables that are most important to your own hypotheses and research questions.

Understanding local perception of representation

Measuring representation will also require that we understand what representation means to local people. We need to understand the meaning to local people of terms such as 'participation', 'representation', and 'democracy' and the local terms that most closely correspond to these concepts. We also need to understand local people's sense of their own right to be heard and to influence those who rule or govern them. Is there a local word for the ability or right to shape local authorities, their decisions, or their actions? Is there an existing local sensibility about being represented or having local governing authorities be responsive or accountable to them? Understanding local perception of 'representation' is an important part of understanding the establishment of representative local authorities and engagement of local people as citizens with these authorities. People's expectations of local authorities are also very important. Where these are very low, beautifully designed local government may inspire little engagement and produced few responsive outcomes. People may disengage even where opportunities for influence are present. These expectations may be based on a history of institutional performance – another variable that researchers should attend to.

Interviews of people concerning what they expect from representation, how they value representation, how they understand it, and how they operationalize it – that is, what elements they think constitute representation, its components and the relations among those components. In the process it is important to understand people's experience with democracy and participation. Have these people engaged in participatory processes or democratic institutions? How do they understand the objectives and outcomes of these processes and how do they understand their own roles within them? Lastly, it will be important to understand whether and how these understandings are changing as a function of REDD and adaptation in interventions.

Understanding how people think of representation will be an essential backdrop to any evaluation of local representation.

iv. Measuring Citizenship and Belonging

Through your institutional mapping and the analysis of representation, you will have identified which institutions hold which powers, to whom they are accountable with respect to the exercise of those powers, and how institutions, their powers and their accountabilities have changed with the advent of REDD and other climate interventions. How do these climate-policy-induced changes in the distribution of powers and accountabilities among institutions affect local citizenships and other forms of belongings? Here RFGI is concerned with changes in the balance among belonging as a citizen or subject under a public representative authority, belonging as a member to other kinds of authority such as identity or interest based groupings.

The core concern of RFGI here is to assess the degree to which REDD and other climate interventions are shaping whether people are engaging as citizens under elected public democratic authorities. To what degree do local elected governments have powers over natural resources sufficient to respond to local needs and aspirations (evaluated under the analysis of powers of representation) and to what degree do the people have the means to influence the exercise of these powers (evaluated under the analysis of accountability)? Do people feel that their leaders are worth influencing? Do they feel they can influence them? When and why do they practice influence and how?

The focus on citizenship and belonging section of the RFGI research interrogates why people identify with and find legitimate local elected government or other local authority structures.¹² What groups do local people adhere to and why? We will analyze how these sentiments and how people act on them have changed with the arrival of REDD and climate adaptation measures. In short, we will evaluate how belonging and identification, as well as active engagement with governing authorities, have changed with changes in the distribution and balance of powers among local institutions. Two relations are to be studied. In the first, identity and belonging are the dependent variables and changes in power among institutions are the independent variables. Have these changes in powers changed the groups people belong to and how vigorously and deeply these bonds are felt? In the second, engagement as

¹² To some degree people find legitimate those authorities who wield powers that are sufficient and meaningful to them— whether or not they can sanction or influence the exercise of those powers. Indeed, they may find those authorities legitimate even if they do not like what they do or whether or not their actions serve the population. It is important to understand legitimacy as the acceptance of an authority without violent resistance. Hitler was ‘legitimate’. Many leaders we do not like are ‘legitimate’. Hence, legitimate does not mean good or bad. It is simply a state in which a leader is accepted. Powers over the management and use of nature are important to local people. Those people who make decisions over resource management and use gain relevance and legitimacy. Hence, the actors with whom natural-resource decisions-making powers are located matter for the consolidation and sustainability of local authorities – it matters for local elected authorities. People gravitate toward those institutions that can deliver access to resources or resource services, in turn strengthening these authorities and legitimating them.

citizens is the dependent variable while identity and belonging are the independent variables. In this way we follow the causal chain 1) from the distribution of powers among institutions, 2) to the forms of belonging and identity available and attractive to local people, 3) to the engagements with authority and influence in governance by local people.

As the balance of powers among elected local government, appointed local government, NGOs, customary authorities, corporations and individuals shifts with the implementation of REDD and other climate actions, so does belonging and identification. For example, when public powers are shifted from the public domain to identity-based (customary, religious, linguistic, place of origin) or interest-based (professional, non-governmental, etc.) institutions the space of public citizenship may be diminished. The powers of elected local government are diminished and so are the reasons for local people to engage with them and to act as citizens to try to influence them. Parallel authorities are strengthened in such a shift. In turn legitimacy of the elected local government is diminished.

As public powers are shifted to parallel institutions RFGI will examine the degree to which people's identities and belongings shift and their sense of the legitimacy of institutions, particularly of elected local governments, changes. Allocations can shift belongings. We are interested in understanding the degree to which these shifts fragment or help integrate political society and popular engagement with governing bodies. We are also interested in the degree to which changes in belonging shift the mix within society of citizen and subject. Under which authorities and to what degree are people able to influence those who govern them and to what degree are they maintained as mere subjects of these authorities.

The questions we are interested in before and after power among local institutions is reconfigured through REDD and adaptation measures are:

- To what degree do people feel they belong to different institutions in the local arena; to what extent do they wish to belong more or less to them?
- What is the basis of their sense of belonging and is it changing with the changing balance of powers among local institutions?
- To what degree do they feel they are able to influence the decisions these institutions are making (in particular related to climate interventions and to forest management and use);
- Through what institutions do they exercise influence over resource related decisions;
- Which institutions do they think make forestry, REDD and adaptation decisions;
- Which institutions do they try to engage (observable instances);
- Which institutions do they think should make different decisions?
- When and how do they engage these institutions?

Some additional questions on citizenship include:

- How do local people understand their rights and their obligations with respect to REDD interventions, adaptation interventions, or other forest management and use decisions;
- How do they understand their rights and obligations with respect to the making of related laws and projects;
- How do they explain the origins of their right to act to influence REDD, adaptation, forestry management and use decisions;
- What means of action (accountability mechanisms and the skills and resources needed to use them) do they perceive as available to them?
- How do local people explain their engagement, lack of engagement, or disengagement with public authorities?
- What do people expect from elected local authorities?
- How do they explain their expectations of local elected authorities?

It is also important to assess the sense of local people of their ability to influence higher scale policies and politics.

- Do local people sense they are able to influence national decision making processes?
- Through what kinds of channels? What examples can they cite?

v. Assessing the Public Domain

The measure of powers of public authorities is the measure of the public domain. As public resources are privatized to individuals, corporations or NGOs and as they are desecularized to customary or religious authorities, they are removed from the public domain. Hence, it is important to examine the balance of powers among the public and these other private domains to understand the scope of the public. Assessing the public domain will come as a result of your analysis of the distribution of power. Those decisions and powers, resources and opportunities that are subject to public decision making constitute the public domain.

This analysis will consist of an evaluation, based on the above analysis of actors, their powers and their accountability relations, of the discretionary powers (executive, legislative and judicial) that are under authorities who are broadly accountable (with respect to these powers) to the population as a whole. How are these powers and accountability relations supported by the legal enabling (or disabling) environment, and how are they created and exercised in practice? How do government and other intervening agents create and limit the local exercise and counter balance of public power? How do local people create and exercise public accountability relations?

C. Note On Methods

The RFGI study is a mixed methods research program. The specific methods to be applied by each research will be developed by that researcher in conjunction with their team leader and or the RFGI core team. The main courses of data for this program will be 1) literature (scholarly, gray and legal), 2) qualitative surveys, 3)

quantitative Surveys, 4) structured interviews, 5) open ended interviews, 6) process tracing, and 7) ethnographic techniques of participant observation. There are many sources from which you can learn about social science research techniques. In your own research proposals, you are expected to develop a set of methods that can plausibly help you obtain the data needed to answer the questions you ask. You must be careful to use methods that can be executed in the time you have allocated for your research and that are within your means and skills. Some excellent articles that can help you understand different methods applied to RFGI types of questions include Brockington 2008; Brady and Collier 2004; Agrawal and Ribot 1999 among many others. These and many other documents will be made available to the research team on a password protected site.

The RFGI core team will be developing some research instruments for all teams to apply. These instruments are under development at present. However, these are not meant to replace any of the methods or instruments you will be using. These will supplement your data and will provide some specific data for cross sectional analysis of a sub-set of the RFGI questions.

Annex A: Research Proposal Outline

For the upcoming methods meeting in Dakar from 9-13 January 2012, please write a research proposal following the outline below. This research proposal is due in writing in Word format on 1 January 2012 to be mailed to RFGI@CODESRIA.Sn. We will confirm receipt of your proposal within 24 hours. If you do not hear from us, assume we did not get it. Send it again or try to contact us through alternative channels. Please use this document for conceptual guidance in revising your proposal.

You will be asked to present your proposed research at the methods meeting and you will receive feedback from your colleagues on the written proposal and oral presentation. You will be asked to revise your proposal during the two week period following the methods meeting. The revised research proposals will be reviewed by two of your RFGI co-researchers and a senior member of the RFGI core team. These research proposals will serve as your own guides to your field research. They must be high quality and well written. If work is still required on your proposals after the second writing, we will ask you to revise and resubmit for another review.

Those of you in research teams will work together to choose an appropriate mix of research sites. You are not bound to the sites you proposed in your applications to RFGI. Each of you were asked to propose two sites in the application. But in the research you conduct under this program we expect you to work in one site only. One site in depth by each research is much better for our purposes than two sites done shallowly. We also expect that individual researchers will only study one site. If you propose to conduct research in more than one site, we expect that this is because you already know both sites well and have conducted considerable research in both sites.

You are not bound to the hypotheses you proposed in your application. You should work on developing original hypotheses of your own that interrogate the RFGI themes.

I. Abstract – 200 words MAXIMUM

Your abstract should clearly present the puzzle you are solving, your objectives in solving it, your main research questions, your hypotheses, your case and your methods. Abstracts are difficult to write, but they force you to condense your ideas into a format in which you (and the reader) can see the main lines of your own work.

II. Introduction – 2 pages maximum

a. Problem statement

i. What is the problem to be explored

ii. Why is it important and to whom is it important

b. Summary of debates around the problem (a short summary of how the literature treats it and where the limits of current knowledge are)

c. Summary of your hypothesis and research questions (these should include your understanding of the RFGI hypotheses and questions AND your own)

- III. Background & Literature Review—What does the literature have to say about your problem – 5 pages maximum¹³
 - a. Cover the practical aspects of the problem you are investigating and the theoretical literature on the problems addressed in your hypotheses. It is good to identify two or three bodies of literature that talk to your broad problematic and that you will review in this section. You should use this review to help you identify where the cutting edge theory and practical questions are.
- IV. Hypotheses and Research Questions – 2 pages maximum
 - a. Hypotheses must address theory. Research is not just to uncover things that we do not know – like what is underneath that rock. Research is primarily to help us identify more general principles that bring us into dialogue with a broader set of understandings that scholars, practitioners and activists have developed over the centuries. You should contribute to knowledge and theory development in this program. When you present your hypotheses, be certain to justify it with a paragraph of discussion after each hypothesis. In that paragraph address the research questions that follow from it.
 - b. Research questions should 1) interrogate your hypotheses with broad questions; 2) lead you to operational (i.e. askable) questions that you must ask to answer your general questions; 3) indicate the data you need to answer these operational questions; and 4) help you to identify the methods you will use to obtain that data. The sample table further down can be useful for helping you to organize your ideas for writing this section and the methods section of your proposal.
- V. Case study
 - a. Where you are going to study your problem – a village, the World Bank office, along a market chain, etc.
 - b. Why is this an advantageous place for studying your problem
 - c. What do you already know about this place
 - i. What data exist
 - ii. What experience do you have there
- VI. Methods
 - a. How you get from your questions to answers
 - b. Time/workplan line that tells us what you will do when
- VII. Works Cited
 - a. A full list of works cited should be included here. Your proposal should be very well referenced.
 - b. You should use the CODESRIA Style Manual for your list of works cited and your citations in the text. The style can be found on line at: <http://www.codesria.org/spip.php?breve3&lang=en>.

¹³ This literature review is the basis for the literature review you will ultimately develop for your research report. In five pages you cannot cover all of the literature you will need to have reviewed for your research. However, the proposal review should be very high quality, very well focused on your research problem and tightly written.

Sample Methods Development Table to help you think through your proposal

This table is just an example—in your problem definition or background section you will have to define your variables and explain what theory has to say about the relations among your variables—and why you expect a particular kind of relation. This table should not be included in your proposal. If you do make such a table, you can include it in an Annex. But, there should be nothing in this table that is not fully described and explained in your proposal. The table is a heuristic to help you identify the methods you will need to use to get the data you need to answer the questions you have to ask to interrogate the hypotheses you pose. So, a useful way to organize a methods discussion is to break down the problem as demonstrated in the table. The contents of this table are not for RFGI. They are an example from a decentralization and environment research program that generated the book that came out of an earlier research program conducted between CODESRIA and World Resources Institute. We have filled in only one section to give you an example of the kinds items that belong in each section. You should delete this sample material and fill the table in with your own hypotheses, questions, data required and methods to be used.

Note that the hypothesis “Decentralization reforms leads to better representation” is not an idle speculation. It is based in this case on democracy theory, new institutional economics theories, public choice theory, neoclassical economic theory, and governmentality theories (see Ribot 2004). This hypothesis did not just fall from the sky. It was produced from a long set of justifications before it was set out in this table to help identify the methods needed to interrogate it. Based on the hypothesis changes in an institutional arrangement called ‘representation’ (which also has to be well defined, as in this document) are being compared with changes in a dependent variable called ‘outcomes’. Hence, we need to be able to ask how these independent and dependent variables change over time. We also need to know what these variables are constituted of Representation here is defined by actors, powers and accountabilities. Therefore these must be assessed. Data on each of these must be obtained. Outcomes here are defined as changes in forest management practice and forest quality. We go from this knowledge of definitions to the data needed and the methods for gathering it. Each of you should go through such an exercise to create your research proposal with theoretically rooted hypotheses, sensible questions, rigorous operational questions, and targeted methods.

This table presents only one of a set of broad questions that would be addressed in a research program such as ours. The table would need many more filled in portions to be complete.

Hypothesis or Primary Research Questions	Operational Questions	Data Required to answer operational questions	Methods for gathering data
<p>Hypothesis 1: Decentralization reforms leads to better representation.</p> <p>Hypothesis 2: More democratic representation leads to more efficient forest management.</p> <p>Question: What is the relation between representation and forestry management outcomes before and after decentralization reforms?</p>	<p>How has representation changed over time (before and after decentralization)?</p>	<p>Measure of representation (i.e. accountability plus responsiveness) change over time in each case:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Change in accountability -Change in responsiveness -Change in citizen engagement -Change in popular demands being reflected in decisions being taken 	<p>Measures before and after decentralization policy implementation of:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Observation of sanctioning by population -Surveys of popular demands -Surveys of decision maker understanding of popular demand -Observation of decision making processes -Decisions (or policies) made
	<p>How have outcomes varied over time (before and after decentralization reforms)?</p>	<p>Measure of outcomes over time</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Change in forest management -Change in hectares under management -Quality of forest health -Change in local income from forests 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Observation and historical interviews concerning change in forest management -Documentation of forest service of forests under management -Transect studies of ligneous density and species mix before and after decentralization reform
Etc.			

The above table can itself be started by a preliminary table that relates the research themes and objectives to hypotheses and research questions. These questions can then be plugged into the above table to help think through the kinds of data and methods necessary.

Research Theme	Objective	Research hypotheses and questions
Choice	To understand how representation is understood and operationalized by intervening agents (in government, international agencies, large NGOs and who are involved in implementing projects and laws).	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Is representation or participation a priority for intervening agents? • What local institutions are chosen by the agents? • Why do they choose these institutions? • What do they think local democracy is constituted of? • How do they translate their understanding into action in their policies or projects?
Recognition	To understand the institutional choices of intervening agents affect local democracy.	Etc.
Recognition -Representation	To understand the institutional choices of intervening agents affect representation of local people in public decisions.	Etc.
Recognition -Citizenship & Belonging	To understand the institutional choices of intervening agents affect public engagement of local people in public decisions.	Etc.
Recognition -Public Domain	To understand the institutional choices of intervening agents create or enclose the space of democracy – the set of public decisions that are under public authority and open to public negotiation.	Etc.

Annex B: Preliminary Country Literature Reviews

Outline of the Background Literature Review

Current Ecological Situation in Forestry

Please provide a brief – one to two page – summary of the state of your country’s forests. Please describe the kinds of forests, changes in forest cover, major ecological problems identified, the kinds of settlements in the forests, and the kinds of industries and other users in the forests. If your country has RDD Readiness Plan Idea Notes (R-

PINS), or REDD readiness plans, these would be ready sources of up-to-date data. But you must cross-check with other sources.

Current Forestry Laws & Institutions

Under current forestry laws, which institutions and actors are recognized within the sector?

- Describe the country's political-administrative structures (see table in Annex D)
- Describe the kinds of forest land categories in place (state, community, protected, reserved, classified, private, etc.),
- Describe the institutions that govern each category of forest land (under whose jurisdiction they fall),
- Describe the organization of these institutions. Organograms of existing institutions are very useful.
- Describe the power attributed by law to elected local governments with respect to forest management and use

Authorities in the Local Arena – initial institutional mapping

From a review of the existing published and gray literature sketch a picture of the existing institutions in the local arena – elected local governments, line ministry offices, prefects, district officers, customary authorities, project implementation units, user groups, NGOs, corporations, political parties, etc. You will later complete this information through direct observation and interviews. Project documents often will also outline the roles of the existing institutions and the institutions with which the particular project is partnering.

For the main local actors within the forestry sector describe:

- Which local authorities exist?
- How is their power or authority constituted (hereditary, appointment, election, charismatic, etc.)? Be specific describe the exact mechanisms behind the constitution of their authority (for example, assess all of the procedures behind electoral processes – candidature, number of parties, frequency of elections, number of council members, etc.).
- What powers do these authorities hold in forestry?
- What powers do these authorities hold in forestry?
- What decisions have different actors taken?
- What are the mandates of different authorities in forestry? What are the formal relations between the different institutions regarding forestry?

Current Interventions

With a focus on forestry, please list and describe major forestry projects and programs, all REDD readiness, REDD, REDD+, and other PES project and programs in the country. Please tell us for each intervention:

- The intervening institutions
- The financial scale of the intervention

- The geographic scale (area covered)
- The geographic location (region of the country)
- Date intervention launched
- The duration of the intervention
- Stage of intervention (planning, test phase, launched, underway, completed, etc)
- Main environmental objectives of the intervention
- Main social objectives of the intervention
- Means by which local people are engaged by the intervention (what are the provisions for rights, recourse, participation or representation)
- For REDD related or PES activities, please describe financing mechanisms, rules of engagement, the kinds of social protections applied, etc.

Please identify which interventions are present in the case areas you intend to study.

Forest Users

Please describe forest users in your country.

- What are the commercial activities and their magnitudes?
 - Domestic uses
 - Exports
- What kinds of subsistence uses are there?
- What populations depend on forests for subsistence?
 - What is their background?
 - Where are they located?
- What kinds of user groups are there?

State of Representation in Forestry

For the authorities that are involved in the forestry sector, please identify which powers they hold, to who they are accountable, and through what mechanisms of accountability they are held accountable. This section should include an evaluation of the institutions foresters recognize in law and in practice, what powers and rights they devolve to those actors, what accountability mechanisms they establish or are used, what rights citizens hold and exercise. This section should also outline problem areas concerning representation of local people in forestry decisions and should sketch out questions to illuminate areas in which data are too scarce.

Insights from broad literature for RFGI

Outline the social science research (political ecology, anthropology, sociology, geography, political economy) on forest use and governance in your country. Summarize its contribution to RFGI categories of inquiry:

- Politics of Choice in Forestry
- Politics of Recognition in Forestry
 - Representation
 - Belonging/Citizenship

- The Public Domain
- Distinctions between discourse, law and practice
 - Distinctions between what is claimed in documents and in general public discourse and what is etched into laws
 - Distinctions between law and practice (implementation and enforcement)

Case Study Site Selection

Each core study country (those with teams) should involve one case of a project type intervention and one case of a policy type intervention. These interventions will be identified based on their closeness to a REDD-like intervention. The case selection will be based on the literature review, the experience of the research team, and consultation with the core RFGI team.

The sites should be chosen based on the existence of baseline data. Sites where extensive studies have already been carried out will be favored. We would particularly like to conduct research where in-depth social research on forestry has been conducted. Good ecological baseline information is also important.

Sites that overlap with those being used by other comparative research programs such as CIFOR's Global Comparative Study on REDD+ (with sites in Cameroon and Tanzania) and the Oxford Climate Center Research program (with a site in Uganda), will be identified and negotiated with CIFOR or other such institutions conducting research at present. RFGI is co-directed by the IUCN. Researchers should seek sites in landscapes where IUCN's Livelihoods and Landscapes Strategy (LLS) has activities and locate your case studies there if these sites are appropriate for the RFGI research. Identify and justify four sites for RFGI research.

Identify and justify four sites for RFGI research.

- REDD and REDD like projects underway
- Areas where REDD policies are likely to have observable effects
- Good sociological data available
- Good ecological data available
- Ongoing studies on environmental change or REDD effects taking place there by other groups
- Expertise within research team on specific sites

Case Selection for Entry Points into Representation & REDD Effects

Measuring representation always involves a measure of representation with respect to the exercise of a power. While the approach to the problem of recognition outlined here starts with the mapping of actors and powers. The research will have to focus on how a key set of those powers are exercised. This might be the power to establish or refuse a contract, the power to allocate title to land or forests, the power to gazette an area as protected or as a carbon reserve, the power to remove people from protected areas, the power to elaborate and approve a management plan, the power to determine the forest management priorities of local people. These are concrete

instances where someone is doing something that can be observed and studied. They are instances where some authority or some process has and exercises some discretion over a public decision. Hence, representation can be evaluated by a tight focus on actors, powers, relations of accountability and acts of citizenship with respect to these micro case study elements – these instances of decision making. No study can evaluate all decisions and all processes. You will have to focus on a few which should be or become evident through your existing knowledge or your field site or through your upcoming initial field work. You want to focus on a decision or set of decisions that are significant to local people and involve values worth struggling over.

You will be analyzing representation, citizenship and the public domain around these specific exercises of power. They may be orderly decision making processes and they may be contentious. It will be good to try to include in your analysis 1) instances of ordinary natural resource decision making, such as how the priorities are set in management plans, and 2) instances of conflict and contentious negotiation, such as Uganda's forced removal of some 22,000 people from areas that are being earmarked for carbon forestry. In all of these instances you will be able to analyze of representation, citizenship and public domain. You will analyze what is happening, why it is happening, who is making decisions, how rural people are represented in those decisions, how the decision makers are held accountable, citizen engagement, etc. These micro-cases will allow you to analyze who has rights (where powers are located), how powers are exercised, how accountability is exercised, and how local populations engage or are excluded. They are mini-lenses into the bigger picture and will ultimately be located in the broader map of institutions and authorities that you are evaluating.

Country Specific Reference List

Provide a complete bibliography of documents on rural representation, forestry, and REDD on your country. See CODESRIA guidelines on document and bibliographical style. All RFGI documents must follow this style. The style can be found on line at: <http://www.codesria.org/spip.php?breve3&lang=en>.

Annex C: Institutional Mapping

Locating authority and decision making – Institutional Mapping of Actors with Powers

The first step in measuring representation is to identify with whom (which individuals, authorities and institutions) powers of concern to your case are located. The powers we are interested in are the classic powers of governing – executive (decision making and implementation), legislative (rule making), and judicial (dispute resolution). We are specifically interested in identifying powers related to REDD and resources in our case studies. The decision making powers of concern to our studies are located at many scales. In RFGI we are primarily interested in the local arena—although we will need to understand how powers are distributed both vertically among layers of governance and horizontally among kinds of institutions and among the public and

private spheres. These powers are exercised based on a number of factors including legal attribution, historical social attribution, and they require the resources (cash, equipment, land, labor) and knowledge or skills to make things happen. For understanding the effects of REDD on governing powers we need to identify the institutions involved and the location of powers before and after REDD. So, we need to analyze how projects and laws that establish decision-making bodies and the laws that distribute powers among them change with REDD. Later through field work and the literature, after understanding where laws place powers, we can analyze where these powers are located in practice.

Legal and project document analysis

Begin with an analysis of laws (constitutions, organic codes, electoral codes, fiscal laws, and sectoral laws) to identify the institutions created by law and to assess their legally attributed powers and accountabilities. The sectoral laws (i.e. the forestry codes and laws) are particularly important. Be sure to examine both legislation and regulations. Most decentralization laws will delay the attribution of powers, leaving it to the health, education and environmental sectoral laws. It is in these sectoral laws that the repartition of powers between central government and local authorities is established. The decentralization laws may say that sectoral powers are under the jurisdiction of the elected local governments, but the sectoral codes will then define what that means. For example, for the forest sector the elected local government may have the right to decide to participate in forestry if it implements a difficult set of labors that are not worth the outcome – management plans, planting, etc. If they decide not to ‘participate’ the forest service might give the forest to commercial merchants to cut down – leaving the rural council with nothing to manage or allocate. In the end, the rural council’s powers usually boil down to the right to provide labor to forest service projects. This is not trivial. A careful analysis of the laws will enable you to analyze exactly what powers are transferred by law. These legal powers may not be the same as the powers transferred in practice. That is to be determined later through your field work.

Using the laws, project documents, and other existing literature, sketch a picture of the existing institutions in the local arena – elected local governments, line ministry offices, prefects, district officers, customary authorities, secret societies, rotating credit associations, project implementation units, user groups, NGOs, corporations, etc. Later complete this information through direct observation and interviews. [This review is to be completed prior to starting field research – a literature review outline is elaborated below in section on literature review.]

Observation and Interviews

Mapping out the local institutional landscape is both the first step when arriving in a field site and a continual requirement. Many of the institutions will not be visible to the casual observer. It will take time before different groups of decision makers reveal themselves to you. You can identify authority structures by asking people who they must go to if they want to use certain forest resources or conduct certain forestry activities. Indeed, you can ask them who they went to last time they needed to use a resource or gain access to markets, etc. It is helpful to start your inquiries with

questions about people's practices, instead of asking about who has authority or rules for protection or management of resources. The latter are taken to be a sign by some of the respondents that you are interested in ensuring the protection/management of forest within the long-established framework of management, which is not what the goal of RFGI research. It is important to establish your conceptual and affiliational neutrality.

Institutional Mapping

One result of the legal and project document analysis, literature review and grounded observations should be a map of the existing institutions including an organogram of the hierarchy of government and of the forest service in your description of the local institutions at play and a sketch of the broader institutional environment they are located in. The map and organogram provide basic descriptions of the institutions that are involved in forestry decision making, the powers of decision, of rulemaking and of adjudication (i.e. executive, legislative & judicial powers) that they hold, the forms of belonging they entail, and the relations of accountability that they are located in. This map must be created for the situation before and the situation after the intervention of interest in your study and/or in areas with and without that intervention. The inter-temporal or cross-sectional differences are the changes that you will need to interrogate and understand. You will want to understand how these changes were caused and whether they are associated with your policy or project in question or other factors that are varying with your particular intervention of interest. You may want to establish a table of institutions and their attributes as in the sample table at the end of this annex.

Institutions are categorized by the ways in which they are empowered to be responsive and to whom they are accountable. The exercise of institution mapping is partly to lay the groundwork for further study of the actors, their powers and their accountability relations. It is partly to see which institutions have emerged when and which have vanished with broader policy and project changes. The initial institutional mapping is a first cut exercise at identifying who is involved in local governing and how, and what are the formal powers and rights over the resources and decisions you are focusing on that are devolved to local authorities and to citizens. The field research that follows is designed to go further into depth in understanding how these different institutions do or do not represent local people in matters of forestry management and use in practice (which might differ from what is allowed on paper). Your institutional mapping should tell us the legal distribution of authorities and powers. Your field research should help us fill out this understanding with insights into the differences between this legal framework and actual practice. Through field research you will examine how institutions demand empowerment and seek to alter accountability in order to optimize their own outcomes relative to other competing or collaborating institutions.

In the case of elected local governments, you will want to give some history of this institution given its important role in the study. When was it constituted, how are elections held, and which powers are in its jurisdiction. Concerning how elections are held, the kinds of data of interest include candidatures and form of election. How is

candidature established – are there independent candidates, are there party-based candidates, are there party lists (slates), etc.? Is it a winner-take-all election or proportional representation? For a helpful table to organize data on local governments see Annex D: Assessing Political-administrative Structures.

Institutional Mapping Sample Table

Below is a sample table of some of the characteristics you may want to look for when mapping institutions in your case area and country. The categories in this table are not complete nor are the kinds of institutions listed. The idea here is not to map all institution, but mainly those who are involved in one way or another with the exercise or influence over the exercise of powers that you are focusing on – this may be forest management, it may be carbon contracting, etc. An institutional mapping exercise could be an enormous task. What you need is a sketch of the institutions involved in your case, not a full analysis of all institutions in your country. An institutional mapping exercise is just a way of getting familiar with the institutional landscape you are looking into. You do, however, want to get to know the institutions you will be studying in much greater detail than this table or a mapping exercise can reflect. Hence, the institutional mapping is a kind of reconnaissance exercise that you will add to as you develop your case study.

Sample Table of Institutions for Institutional Mapping

Institution	How constituted (elected, appointed, self-selected)	Powers & Roles in forestry & other areas	Legal and social basis of those powers	Basis of membership or belonging	Relations of accountability (to whom & how)	Size & number (no. of members, geographic extent, number of institutions in area)
Elected Local Government						
Appointed Local Admin. (prefect or district officer)						
Local forestry office						
Customary Authorities						
Cooperatives						
NGOs						
Private corporations						
Private individuals						
User groups						
Project implementation units						
Project committees						
Rotating credit associations						
Women's groups						
Secret societies						
Religious groups						
Ethnic associations						
Etc.						

Note that an institutional mapping should not be more than a short section within your final research report. It should probably be in an annex having enabled you to write several paragraphs describing which institutions are in play in your area, their roles and powers in natural resources management and how those are changing with the interventions you are studying.

Annex D: Assessing Political-administrative Structures

Table of Political-administrative Structures

Cross-Cutting Structures	
Data for national level	
Is there an association of elected local authorities?	
What are the procedural rights for NGOs and CSOs?	
What recourse is available to local councils to assure the transfer of legally attributed powers and access to state resources?	

Data for each level of sub-national government & administration [provide organizational diagram]				
	Levels of sub-national Government			
	Level 1	Level 2	Level 3...	Most local level
No. of councils				
Average scale in area				
Average scale in population				
Form of representation/council at each level [how is it organized— number of reps, etc.]				
Form of election for each political level <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Candidature • Suffrage • Winner take all/proportional [describe in detail]				
Process of appointment for each administrative level				
Functions of each political and administrative level				
Powers of each level <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • executive [means, implementation, enforcement, etc.] • legislative [rule/bylaw 				

<p>making]</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • judicial [dispute resolution functions] 				
<p>Mandates from above</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Funded mandates • Partially funded mandates • Unfunded mandates 				
Discretionary powers				
Sources of revenue available to councils [taxes, fees, loans, private grants, block grants from central government, other funds from central government and ministries]				
Criteria for central funding allocations				
Indicators of the horizontal distribution of revenues from each source at each level				
Age of councilors/presidents				
Ethnic mix of councilors/presidents				
Education level of councilors/presidents				
What data and literature are available on councils, elections, accountability, performance? Constitute a bibliography for each level of political administrative hierarchy.				
Non-electoral formal accountability mechanisms in place (recall, courts, civil liberties and procedural rights for third parties, etc.)				
Requirements for reporting to citizens (publishing meeting minutes, publishing budgets, participatory budgeting)				
Requirements for reporting up the hierarchy to ministries				
Government oversight and approval systems for decisions made by local councils (does				

district officer sign off on decisions...)				
Arrangements for public participation (participatory budgeting, open meetings....)				
Arrangements for separation of powers in local arena				

Annex E: Accountability Mechanisms

Below is a list of accountability mechanisms that emerge in the literature and that I compiled for an earlier publication (Ribot 2004). Brinkerhoff (2001) provides an excellent analysis, making accountability issues much more legible. Hirschman's (1970) analysis of exit, voice, and loyalty may be another frame for organizing an analysis of accountability. This list, however, is not systematized around either framework. Nevertheless, it illustrates that there are multiple mechanisms that policy makers can use to establish greater public accountability of government and of other local authorities that hold public powers.

Legal recourse through courts is an important means of accountability. Independent judiciaries are critical for holding public figures accountable. Often the judiciary is not independent for numerous structural reasons. For example, local authorities who may very appropriately have the power to adjudicate among local citizens should not adjudicate inter-jurisdictional cases or cases between themselves and others (Oloka-Onyango 1994, 463; Mamdani 1996a; Agrawal and Ribot 1999). Regardless of whether courts are well structured, they are inaccessible to many citizens in Africa. They are often too far away or too expensive or complex for average citizens to use. Public interest law associations can help to ensure that poor and marginal populations have greater access to legal recourse (Veit and Faraday 2001). Rothchild cites the office of the tribunal *administratif*, which was introduced by the French, and the office of the ombudsman as two useful recourse structures (Rothchild 1994, 6). Such complaint officers have been established in South Africa, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe (Therkildsen 2001, 27, fn. 26, 29–30).^{iv}

There is often a failure to **separate powers of the judiciary, legislative, and executive**, particularly at the local level. Without separation of powers, there is no balance of powers within government and no alternative routes for people to challenge representatives and administrators or to change or even enforce the rules by which all branches of government operate. This is what O'Donnell (1999, 38, in Brinkerhoff 2001, 3) calls "horizontal accountability." In the colonial period, the judiciary and executive branches were fused in the local arena both through the *indigenat* courts of the French system and in the British system of Indirect Rule. This failure to separate powers denies recourse, as it does in Uganda's local governments. It is a problem in many other countries as well. The failure to separate powers often denies recourse to individuals who have disputes with technical services. (Mamdani 1996a; Oloka-Onyango 1994, 463)

Ostrom (1999) argues that **polycentricity** of government and the **balance of powers** are important structural aspects of accountability. A balance of powers in which there are counterpowers to the central government can increase accountability by increasing the number of actors with a voice in politics and the ability of non-central actors to scrutinize central institutions. The World Bank (2000, 112) suggests that there is a need to institutionalize the balance of powers between national and local governments through rules that protect and limit the rights of sub-national governments. Ostrom (1999) supports the notion of polycentricity of government,

suggesting it introduces such a balance. She argues that multiple loci of power, combined with higher levels of government whose role is to protect people from the excesses of power of local elite actors, are necessary for balancing power.

Independent or third-party monitoring by elected comptrollers, NGOs, or the associative movements can help construct downward accountability. In some countries, such as the United States, there are elected town comptrollers. These officials monitor the affairs of local government for the local community. NGOs and other associations can also play a monitoring role. While they should have no powers over community resources or decisions (since NGOs are private bodies and are not necessarily accountable or representative), they can monitor local and national government to ensure they are meeting their legal obligations. They can also inform the local population and/or file suit if the government is not living up to its requirements. NGOs and associations can also, of course, lobby on behalf of the portion of civil society that they represent.

The literature contains good examples of independent monitoring. Blair (2000, 24) describes Bolivia's vigilance committees, which were created to monitor elected bodies; its members are "selected" from traditional local governance systems, including peasant unions and neighborhood councils. In Canada, Native American women recently blamed tribal chiefs of "rigging elections, stealing government money, and going on fancy gambling vacations in the States, while their people live in third world poverty" (Brooke 2001, A3). These women have formed the First Nations Accountability Coalition. One member has used hunger strikes to demand accountability of the Native American chiefs and of the members of Canada's government who support them. The group also has put together a document recounting numerous instances of corruption and has held "hearings" on the matter around the country. They also have delivered their findings to Canada's Senate.

Confederations, federations, and unions of associations and other groups within society can constitute an associative movement. One example is Senegal's FONG (the Federation of NGOs), which is a nationally constituted lobbying group representing a variety of rural associations around Senegal. Such associative movements can be supported by enacting legislation permitting associations, federations, and confederations to form, and by organizing assistance. They can foster accountability by monitoring, informing, and **lobbying**. While lobbying has been supported as an activity to hold governments to account, it can be very difficult and risky in the absence of recourse and other legislation that allows people to organize and pressure their governments. Of course, lobbying also can reduce accountability toward the less powerful and be highly skewed toward more powerful interest groups.

Transparency—that is, openness to public scrutiny—is an accountability mechanism frequently called for by international organizations.^v The members of working groups at the 1993 international conference titled "Local Self-governance, People's Participation, and Development" held in Kampala "stressed again and again the necessity for greater transparency and accountability at all levels of government to ensure efficiency and honesty. . . . Democratic reforms and checks and balances at all

levels of government are needed to ensure that good governance can be sustained over time” (Rothchild 1994, 6). Another means to increase transparency is to **provide information** on the roles and obligations of government. This information can be provided by the media, by NGOs, and even by government as indicated in public reporting requirements.

It is important, however, to remember that transparency is not enough. In many countries corruption is transparent. It is often plainly visible that ministers and other government officials drive cars and live in houses that they could never afford on their salaries. But nothing is done. Transparency does not work by itself. Other accountability mechanisms enabling people to sanction government in reaction to new information must also be available.

A **free media** can also play a monitoring role. A free media can shape public action. Sen (1981) argues that free media can avert famine. The media also can disseminate important information to local populations on what their rights are and what they can expect from their local government leaders (cf. Tendler 1997, 15). The participants in a 1994 conference on decentralization in Ouagadougou agreed that while representation is necessary, “citizen participation in local affairs is necessarily limited when there are constraints on the freedom of association and the liberty of expression” (Mbassi 1995, 28). **Freedom of speech** more generally, then, is an important issue. It is needed at the national scale in terms of free media and legal protections of freedom of expression. It is direly needed in the most local arenas, where women and minorities are often unable to express themselves freely—particularly in public meetings and through representatives.

The practice of **public discussion** also can increase transparency. This practice is often used in Africa where elders gather to discuss community matters in public. Also, in the Mhondoro cults of Africa, spirit mediums speak and are interpreted in public to express the will of ancestors (Spierenburg 1995). The practice of holding **public meetings** with representatives to discuss budget and policy decisions also can increase transparency. In Uganda, many local people did not feel listened to by their representatives. Nonetheless, people felt it was very important to gather and to exchange views with each other at local council meetings. One survey reported that sixty-three percent of Ugandans claim to participate in the local council decision-making process (Saito 2000, 8). Public fora have serious limits since marginalized groups, such as women, religious minorities, or immigrants, may not feel comfortable voicing their opinions. As a result, public fora should not provide the only opportunities for people to express themselves. A requirement of **public reporting**, such as the weekly posting of budgets in local papers or just on the wall of the local government building, is another mechanism to render government accountable. If budgets, decisions, and planned programs and spending are publicly posted, people will have an easier time discerning whether local government is serving their interests. This is a very easy mechanism to legislate.

Participatory processes also can be employed to improve dialogue between government and people. Through facilitated processes of participation in which

information is exchanged, people can learn which services government can provide, and expectations can be built. In this manner, people can learn to make more demands on their representatives. Orchestrated participation also can increase public participation in decision making in a way that complements or strengthens other representative organs and adds to the public's ability to make demands on local authorities. The danger is when "participatory" methods are used as an alternative to representative and accountable government—indeed, as a way of avoiding government. This use of participation can undermine the legitimacy and accountability of local government.

Civic education is important for building accountability of government. It empowers people to *know their rights* and to *know the powers and obligations of their representatives*. In Uganda, many local people do not know how the elected local councils work. Many are suspicious that "the local leaders are eating [their] money." Explaining democratic local government to people can engage them in governing processes. One Ugandan woman to whom decentralization was explained for the first time said, "In the past I was unwilling to pay my tax because I was not clear how the money was used. Now I am willing to pay it since I now know how it is used" (Saito 2000, 10). **Education** writ large is also important for forming a critical citizenry. General education, which includes literacy, numeracy, analytical skills, history, and other information dissemination, is another way to empower people to make demands on their representatives.

Placing **discretionary powers** in the hands of local leaders can increase the accountability of government and increase the engagement of civic organizations in public affairs. Cofinancing, in which communities are required to provide a portion of the funds for a given program, has been proposed as a way to give communities "ownership" of local programs. While "experience so far is that this is both patronizing and empirically difficult to substantiate," cofinancing may produce some positive outcomes, according to Onyach-Olaa and Porter (2000, 25). They observed that where the funds transferred were truly discretionary and seen as a supplement to local funds, local councils "have no difficulty in principle contributing a major share of their revenue," and where there is no required contribution, local councils "have begun to utilise the funds in very inventive ways" with higher efficiency and "multiplier" effects.^{vi} "If truly discretionary resources are made available, experience so far suggests that room begins to be created for better 'downward accountability,' to local constituents who expect and demand that councilors will stretch the resources as far as possible" (Onyach-Olaa 2000, 25). Joshi (personal communication, Institute of Development Studies, Sussex 1999) observed that in India civil society organizations begin to form around and lobby strong local governments; this supports the argument that having discretionary powers within the local arena is one way to make local government accountable. Without powers, there is actually no reason for anyone to even try to hold local government to account.

Proximity of leaders to their community and their **embeddedness** in local social relations can also make some difference. Community-based natural resource management is believed to increase accountability because the community is nearby

and is closely involved in the formulation and implementation of natural resource management (Hue 2000, 4). The way authorities are embedded in social relations within their communities may help to make them more accountable to the local population. Authorities within the communities they govern must live with the consequences of their decisions on people they know and who know them. This fact may influence their decision making. Clearly, different **ideologies** or belief systems of leaders and their communities can also have an influence on accountability relations although these may be less amenable to policy intervention. For example, the Fon (Ghanaian chief) feels that the community is in his hands and that this is a responsibility he has inherited.

Civic dedication can play an important role too. Tendler (1997, 15) shows that public sector workers can be highly dedicated to their jobs. This was in the context where civil servants were given greater autonomy than usual and performed quite well at their jobs. "On the one hand, workers wanted to perform better in order to live up to the new trust placed in them by their clients and citizens in general. The trust was a result of the more customized arrangements of their work and the public messages of respect from the state. On the other hand," Tendler continues, "the communities where these public servants worked watched over them more closely. The state's publicity campaigns and similar messages had armed citizens with new information about their rights to better government and about how public services were supposed to work." Along these lines, awards for community service can be another accountability mechanism. Codes of conduct for politicians and civil servants can be another means of moral leverage; these have been applied in South Africa, Tanzania, and Uganda (Therkildsen 2001, 27, fu. 26).

Reputations that societies hold people to and people want to maintain can also shape their public and private behavior (Bordieu 1977). **Trust** is another element that, if developed, is believed to improve the accountability of local governments. Putnam (1993) argues that environments with numerous civil society organizations; social networks that link people to government, society, and business; and relations based on shared values and trust enjoy greater levels of mutual accountability within state, market, and civil society. This in turn is argued to lead to more efficient government and a more synergetic relation between state and civil society. (Evans 1997; Bebbington and Kopp 1998, 13)

Administrative dependence on local elected authorities can increase administrative accountability to local populations. Blair (2000) points out that administrative bodies should be accountable to elected authorities and elected authorities should be accountable to the people. Entrusting local government to manage service and development activities within the public domain involves making public-resource users and public-service providers accountable to local government. This can be accomplished by enabling local government to contract out service provision, to provide it in-house when appropriate, and to have control over the advisors and experts they hire or who offer them services from NGOs or the central state. Creating mechanisms so that local government can contract competitively with line ministries or private service providers and experts may affect the accountability of these service

providers (cf. Therkildsen 2001, 27, fn. 26). This strategy attempts to create competition among service providers and incentives for providing better services. For this purpose it may require central government to commit to providing local government with a budget—a budget drawn from the resources central government would ordinarily have spent directly supporting line ministries—or it may require taxation powers.

Administrative dependence may also involve making private organizations and NGOs accountable to local government by requiring local government approval for the use and management of commonly held public resources. For outside projects involving ad hoc or permanent planning and coordination committees, local government authorities would have the final decision-making power over their activities to ensure that these activities were under representative community control. The law can make local administration (even deconcentrated services) subordinate to elected local government. In this manner, local elected government can have decision-making powers, veto powers, or other forms of control over the decisions of central government ministries in matters determined to be within local jurisdiction.

According to some analysts, **taxation** arrangements can seriously affect the relations of accountability between people and their governments. Moore (1997) has forcefully argued that governments that depend on taxes derived from the earned income of their populations are more likely to have populations that make demands on government and hold their governments accountable. (Therkildsen (2001, 30) has found that user charges serve a similar function.) Moore also has argued the converse, that governments dependent on outside assistance are not likely to be accountable to their populations. (Also see Guyer 1992; Yates 1996.) In much of Africa, local governments have had difficult times collecting taxes. Local tax rates and collection have declined in countries such as Kenya, Nigeria, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe (Therkildsen 1993, 84–5). In southern Nigeria, rates fell from eight percent of income in 1968 to less than two percent for poorer farmers by 1988. “With such low contributions . . .,” writes Guyer, “financial management becomes a poor basis for people’s demands for accountability; with no graduation of taxation there is no official theory of inequality and no way for the poorer majority to demand higher contributions from their wealthy brethren; with no property tax there is no basis for . . . growing outside business in the area to support its development. . . . The material basis for a [Western style] form of democratic struggle for accountability and control is more or less defunct” (Guyer 1992, 57, in Therkildsen 1993, 85).

Central government can play the role of ensuring accountability of local government; it also must be accountable for some services to local government. Central government’s **oversight** of local government can help ensure that local government is accountable to local populations (cf. Tendler 1997, 15). Uphoff and Esman (1974, xx) state, “Sanctions to control the acts of leaders of local organizations should be balanced both from above and from below to get the best performance” (emphasis in original). Parker (1995, 35) also argues for central monitoring and sanctions to “penalize institutions that do not carry out their functions appropriately.” Tendler (1997), however, cautions against this sanction-based approach, pointing out that

greater degrees of local autonomy can improve government performance of community services. (Cf. Evans 1997.) A system of internal performance audits can also ensure accountability (Rothchild 1994, 6).

Social movements are another effective tool for holding governments accountable to their people (Mamdani and Wamba-dia-Wamba 1995). Resistance and threats of resistance can motivate governments to act on behalf of concerned populations when other accountability mechanisms fail. Social movements, resistance, sabotage, and other forms of rebellion can be effective ways for local populations to create a domain of local autonomy or to make government responsive (Ribot 2000; cf. Scott 1976). However, as the participants in a 1994 conference on decentralization in Ouagadougou agreed, while representation is necessary, “citizen participation in local affairs is necessarily limited when there are constraints on the freedom of association and the liberty of expression” (Mbassi 1995, 28). Such freedoms are critical for enabling the formation of groups ranging from NGOs, peasant organizations, and vigilance committees, to whole social movements.

Annex F: REDD – what is it and what does it do?

Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation is a number of different things that we will in general call REDD. Different groups are using ‘REDD’, including the UN, NORAD, USAID, many large NGOs. REDD or REDD+, in its multiple forms, will result in some concrete changes in some real places. These changes may take place in the name of REDD, REDD+, REDD++ or REDD readiness or as carbon-market investments. All are forms of ‘payment for ecosystem service’ – in this case, payments for carbon storage. Those changes may be specific interventions that involve partnering with or funding local actors. It may be in the form of more general changes in prices or a broader ‘enabling environment’. These may all take place in the form of projects or policies. This project studies the democracy effects of REDD. So, what then is this ‘REDD’ that shall have effects? What changes shall take place that are supposed to add up to ‘REDD’ such that this project has an object of study?

REDD+ (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation) is defined by Angelsen et al. (2009:2 as cited in Sunderlin et al., 2010) “...an umbrella term for local, national and global actions that reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation, and enhance forest carbon stocks in developing countries (REDD+). The plus sign indicates enhancement of forest carbon stock, also referred to as forest regeneration and rehabilitation, negative degradation, negative emissions, carbon uptake, carbon removal or just removals. [Removals refer to sequestration of carbon from the atmosphere and storage in forest carbon pools.] ... REDD+ is shorthand for both a set of policies or actions that aim to reduce emissions and increase removals and for the final outcomes of those policies or actions (i.e. reduced emissions and

increased removals).” For more discussion of REDD see Annex F and also see the forthcoming RFGI occasional papers by Anderson and Zerriffi and by Rutt.¹⁴

Researchers have already studied carbon-credit schemes, REDD pilot projects, and REDD-Readiness schemes in Uganda (Anderson and Zerriffi 2011) and Tanzania (Beymer and Bassett forthcoming) and elsewhere. As a payment for ecosystem services, carbon and REDD interventions have certain distinctions from earlier forestry interventions. Concretely, these interventions will require, among other things: 1) clear property rights so that REDD or other PES contracts can be allocated, 2) knowledge of contracting for individuals or groups to engage with REDD or other PES programs, 3) knowledge of carbon forestry for individuals and groups to engage with REDD or other PES programs, 4) a minimum size of forested or reforestation-ready land holding to obtain a contract, 5) sufficient land security to be able to hold a contract over the long-term which will be required by REDD, and 6) access to a bank account or other means for receiving REDD and similar payments (Anderson and Zerriffi 2011). Some individuals and groups will be able to meet these conditions, or will have the land, knowledge, and security to be able to establish them. Many others will not. Those who cannot plant trees because they have insufficient land to even grow their subsistence crops will be excluded. Those individuals and communities without official title to land or recognized rights to land and resource use will be excluded. Those without knowledge and capital are at risk of being excluded. Those who cannot wait long periods for returns on investments risk being excluded. REDD will create new divisions and will have re-distributional effects. Further, individuals and entire communities will be excluded as outside REDD funders choose local authorities, groups and individuals to engage with. Some will be chosen and others will not. Carbon credits and REDD will affect both policy and project design and implementation – as well as the timing of products generated. These changes affect who can and does participate or benefit (Anderson and Zerriffi 2011).

Even without generating carbon credits, forestry activities like tree planting can create exclusions. For example, tree planting is reserved for select individuals since: Tree planting by tenants threatens ‘owners’ where tree-planting is seen as a claim to land; Security to plant trees requires long-term land access; Women tend to be less-likely to have land title or to inherit land, becoming more marginal with forest-land value increases – so they are excluded from planting or benefitting from carbon stocks; Smallholders cannot grow trees on limited land due to competition with crops; Tree-planting investments require a certain level of wealth and resources (Anderson and Zerriffi 2011.) When carbon credits are generated through small-farmer forestry activities, new **conflicts**, new forms of **exclusion**, new **vulnerabilities**, and new problems of **representation** were observed in initial studies by Anderson and Zerriffi (2011).

¹⁴ The most recent REDD+ guidelines that have been agreed to by the international community are articulated in Draft Decision 1 of the Sixteenth Conference of Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (Decision 1/CP.16.Add.1).

Conflict was observed between central government (marketed carbon) and local (timber/use/NTFP) objectives. New forms of **exclusion** emerged around land access due to: Contracts being with those owning or managing forests – not necessarily those using them; Only the wealthy being able to afford private title to land – especially as land value rises; Few people being able to invest at the required large scales; Few people being able to make the necessary long-term investments; Those without land becoming more insecure as land is grabbed and enclosed.

Additional entry **barriers** to forestry are being created by knowledge required for carbon projects. Knowledge is needed on carbon species and management, carbon enhancement in existing forests, for interacting with monitoring and verification groups, to access carbon markets, and for contracting. REDD will also bring along with it a scientific discourse that will require expert status to decipher. Many institutions will claim special needs for scientific knowledge and will produce new exclusions cloaked in ‘scientistical’ language (Ribot and Oyono 2005). These are different from the knowledge concerning species, carbon markets, contracting and intermediaries. This is the kind of knowledge that is contested in ordinary pre-REDD forestry. Every forester in the Sahel talks of the zone as ‘fragile’ despite that everything fragile in the region died long ago. They talk of need for forest management plans despite that good data show that these management plans have no ecological effects – regrowth and species mixes are the same as in unmanaged areas (Wurster 2009). But cloaked in science, these discourses justify great donor investment to pay foresters to make management plans that are too expensive for local populations to implement. The political economic gains – to forest services and donors – from such discourses will be important to evaluate.

Vulnerabilities can increase since monocrop plantations are easier to verify for carbon, leading to less diversity and increased vulnerability for those who use forests as famine fallback areas. Carbon areas are also sometimes cordoned off from use by subsistence users, and carbon species differ from those local people need. Participation – despite all of its well-known flaws/slants – is also being compromised. Community consultations are required by carbon-market rules and REDD. But, in carbon-related projects, private carbon firms consider community consultations to be too costly, so they are avoiding or minimalizing consultation. Their primary goal is commercial.

REDD interventions (policies and projects) will affect local **representation** – which we define as responsiveness and accountability of leaders, and will elaborate on in section II. REDD will effect representation in several ways: 1) New opportunities and resources will require broad representation in public decision making processes; 2) New management objectives for collectively managed and used resources (forests) will require public decision making; 3) REDD interventions will shift the benefits, burdens and powers among actors in the local and national arena. In so doing, there will be losers and winners, conflicts and new forms of cooperation that will shape and reshape roles of local and national authorities; 4) The shift of powers between public and private spheres may weaken or strengthen elected authorities, reconfiguring their ability to be responsive to local needs and aspirations; and 5) New rules and

regulations will also reconfigure accountability relations that may enable or disable local people from holding their leaders accountable and making them representative. Representation in turn has effects on REDD, its implementation, sustainability and legitimacy.

Carbon and REDD are reshaping donor and government funding priorities. Are there kinds of projects and policies that will end due to a focus on REDD? What will happen to funding for forestry that is now taking place under the labels of participatory, social, community-based, joint-management, co-management, adaptive-co-management, community-driven, or democratically decentralized? Will they be replaced by REDD interventions or will they be subordinated or harnessed to them? Or, will there be new complementary funding that deepens and broadens these forestry approaches?

What will happen to people who depend on productive systems that are considered – often wrongly – to be damaging to forests. Swidden systems are typical of forest use that might be compromised by REDD or carbon markets. Can REDD distinguish degradation and deforestation from temporal vegetation dynamics inherent to swiddening? Will REDD and carbon markets preclude marginal groups from practicing this livelihood system in the name of carbon storage? (Sturgeon 2005....)

REDD may also lead to new instabilities in the use of nature and in its durability due to commodification. REDD and carbon markets are the ultimate commodification of nature. What will commodification of nature do? Polanyi (1944) saw nature as a fictive commodity and viewed its commodification as destructive. If markets drive forest value, then a whole new set of risks are introduced. What happens if carbon market prices fall – will we allow the markets to then convert forests into timber? What happens if they go up and the motive to exclude grows? Once we let markets determine forest value – versus use value – then what happens to those who depend on forests for use?

REDD will also have effects through its intended social protections. REDD's farmers acknowledge that REDD risks 'decoupling conservation from development', enabling 'powerful REDD consortia to deprive communities of their legitimate land-development aspirations', undermining 'hard-fought gains in forest management practices', and eroding 'culturally rooted not-for-profit conservation values' (FAO et al. 2008, 4-5).¹⁵ They also acknowledge 'that REDD benefits in some circumstances may have to be traded off against other social, economic or environmental benefits' and call for care in taking local place-based complexity into account when designing REDD interventions (FAO et al. 2008, 4-5). These tradeoffs may be important for wellbeing.

REDD safeguards to ensure both ecological protection and social wellbeing are being developed. The Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR) and others have

¹⁵ For further discussion of risks, see Phelps et al. 2010; Chhatre and Agrawal 2010; Anderson and Zerriffi 2011.

called for REDD+ to systematically address 'Effectiveness, Efficiency, Equity, and (the +) Co-benefits' – what they call 3Es+ (Angelsen 2009). The UN-REDD Programme and others call for legal instruments and stipulations to protect local forest-based communities, such as a right to Free Prior Informed Consent (FPIC), in a global convention or national legislation to protect indigenous forest people (UN-REDD 2010; Colchester 2010). A Norwegian Government report (Angelsen et al. 2009) proposes developing principles to promote participation: 'Definition of rights to lands, territories, and resources, including ecosystem services; Representation in REDD decision making, both internationally and nationally, including access to dispute resolution mechanisms; and Integration of REDD into long-term development processes.' Recently, a set of social and environmental safeguards were agreed to at the Sixteenth Conference of Parties in Cancun in 2010 (UNFCCC Decision 1/CP.16.Add.1). Where these protections are put in place their effects on representation will also have to be studied.

How is REDD+ different from other forestry activities?

Because REDD+ will be different in every country and will build on existing forest structures and be adapted to local contexts (Tacconi et al. 2010), it is difficult to specify in detail how REDD+ will be implemented and how it will differ from other forest management activities. A few broad differences are however apparent (see Anderson and Zeriffi forthcoming):

National-level Approach - Although it is acknowledged that links will need to be made between national level plans and sub-national projects and initiatives, most proposals for REDD+ support a national-level approach to forest management that allows for country-level monitoring and planning (Irawan and Tacconi 2009; Tacconi et al. 2010).

Large-Scale - REDD+ is also much larger than any previous forest development initiative (Angelsen 2009).

Social and Environmental Safeguards – REDD+'s social and environmental safeguards and guidelines have been broadly agreed to and refer to international standards and norms (UNFCCC Decision 1/CP.16.Add.1).

Performance-based - Unlike many conventional initiatives, REDD+ is performance based, includes a requirement to verify both environmental and social outcomes based, and is being closely scrutinized by many organizations and individuals (Angelsen 2009).

For the purposes of this research program, we need to identify and examine each carbon and REDD intervention (and protection) and ask 1) what is the intervention, 2) what does it change in practice from previous practice, 3) what are the effects of that change on distribution of benefits (who wins and loses – among individuals, households, identity groups, institutions), and 4) what are the changes in procedure (who is affected and how)?

Once we have specified what REDD is and what it does, we can evaluate how those changes shape or reshape representation. How do different carbon and REDD interventions affect 1) local authority (via partnerships, empowerment, recognition, etc.), 2) transfers of powers, 3) commodity prices, 4) etc. How do they affect citizenship and belonging via empowerment of different authorities and the distribution of benefits and effects on wellbeing and security?

For further reading on REDD, please see RFGI forthcoming working papers by Anderson and Zeriffi and by Rutt. These will be made available on the CODESRIA, IUCN and UIUC web pages.

REDD and Social Protections

The agreement of multiple nations on a set of guiding ideas and social and environmental safeguards in Cancun represents a significant step in the development of REDD+. These guiding ideas and safeguards are driven by a set of principles, a complete list can be found in Appendix I of Decision 1/CP.16.Add.1. It is acknowledged that REDD+ should:

- Be country-driven
- Be undertaken in accordance with national development priorities, objectives and circumstances and capabilities and should respect sovereignty
- Be consistent with Parties' national sustainable development needs and goals
- Be implemented in the context of sustainable development and reducing poverty
- Be supported by adequate and predictable financial and technology support, including support for capacity building
- Be results based
- Promote sustainable management of forests

Safeguards that should be "promoted and supported" in REDD+ include:

- Actions compliment or are consistent with the objectives of national forest programs and relevant international conventions and agreements
- Transparent and effective national forest governance structures, taking into account national legislation and sovereignty
- Respect for the knowledge and rights of indigenous peoples and members of local communities, by taking into account relevant international obligations, national circumstances and laws
- The full and effective participation of relevant stakeholders, in particular indigenous people and local communities

Actions are not used for the conversion of natural forests, but instead to incentivize the protection and conservation of natural forests and their ecosystem services, and to enhance other social and environmental benefits.

Note that with respect to representation, in these ‘protections’ are vague. Who will determine who the ‘relevant stakeholders’ are? Are people who live in forests and depend on them equal to merchants in far away cities who exploit these forests for timber to sell on the international market? How will these different interests be weighed? Should indigenous people be privileged over long-standing residents Europeans or Mestisos who have been living on and working in forests for multiple generations? How are interests of different claimants to be evaluated and under what form of authority? These questions are left open and leave room for wide interpretation of what constitutes a fair form of representation in decision-making processes.

Annex G: Discourse, Law and Practice – three levels of study

Each country case study will start with a review of the existing literature. This review will analyze what we already know about the Discourse on REDD within the country, the Laws or rules being put in place for REDD programs, and the Practices that are already unfolding on the ground.

The textual discourse on REDD is important to understand since it is the way in which REDD is being presented and ostensibly understood. The law and rules are important since they reflect the way that policy makers and project designers intend for REDD to actually work. The difference between discourse and law is important. This difference should be an object of analysis since it can reveal the political struggles between the desires or expectations of intervening agents and the actions that these agents and governments are able and willing to take. For example, democratic decentralization is often lavishly described in the discourse of development and of governments as the building of new local democracy. Yet, many of the laws that are created in its name would not create local democracy even if implemented (Ribot 2004). An analysis of discourse should describe the discourse and the changes that this discourse implies to current practice.

Law is important to understand in its minutia because law is the codified intention of government. It is in law that government shows its intentions. Of course, governments know that not all laws are implemented, so it can make laws without expecting to implement them. But, it does so as part of the production of its image of what it wants its constituents to understand are its objectives. The analysis of law and rules of government and projects tells us specifics of who will be empowered with what new powers and within what sets of constraints. This is important to understand so as to know what each research team will be studying in the field. Changes in law and policy are always redistributive. The object of an analysis of law or policy is to understand what redistributions they will, or are attempting to, create.¹⁶ The review must

¹⁶ “Government constricts ... freedom whenever it prevents someone from acting as he wishes—stealing other’s property, for instance. Since justice obviously requires such constraints, it does require some compromise with freedom. Government restricts...liberty, on the other hand, only when it prevents people from doing what they have a right to do: to speak out on political issues, for example.” He continues that there is no “...general right to freedom, but instead only a set of ‘liberty rights’ that

describe the existing laws, analyze the distributions of authority and power that they establish and maintain, describe new laws and analyze the changes in authority and power that they imply.

Practice is critical since ultimately governments and projects are what they do. What they do often differs greatly from the discourse and from the laws and rules created to translate discourse into practice. The differences between laws and practice are important because they tell us, once analyzed in the field, why and how implementation works or does not work. Practice reflects the physical, technical, social and political constraints faced by policy makers and project designers as their projects move from paper to into the social and material world. The review of practice within the literature should describe what is being done in the name of REDD and REDD-like laws and projects and what effects have been measured of those changes in practice.

These same categories of discourse, law and practice should be kept in mind as researchers move from the literature review to the field research. The literature review should be part of the final working paper that each researcher is expected to produce. Each review should examine how choices are constructed and the effects of recognition and each should do so in the context of changes that are expected or taking place concerning the actors empowered, the powers they hold and the forms of accountability they are embedded in. The analysis of these categories should always be with an eye to how changes underway affect representation of rural populations in forestry and broader decision making processes.

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all follow from basic political rights we all should have." (Grayling 2011:58 on Ronald Dworkin's philosophy.)

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ⁱ This is partly why I have called the structures being established in the name of decentralization in the natural resources sectors in Africa a 'modern reproduction of indirect rule' (Ribot 1999).

ⁱⁱ Including instances where the authorities being recognized are created by those recognizing them.

ⁱⁱⁱ Taylor's (1994) 'politics of recognition' describes a set of tenets for redressing identity-based inequities. For Taylor, recognition redresses inequities by privileging cultures and identity groups that

have been marginalized. The politics of recognition identifies marginality as a product of 'misrecognition' or prejudices against cultures and cultural forms. Taylor argues that misrecognized cultures must be 'recognized'—promoted, protected and empowered—so as to enable individual members to develop a positive image of themselves and to fulfill their potential as individuals within the broader society. Recognition, for Taylor, is an act of enfranchisement.

78. “The Zimbabwe ombudsman handles on average 100 complaints a month, while the Tanzanian handled 200 cases per month during its first 20 years of existence” (Therkildsen 2001, 29).

79. According to Therkildsen (2001, 27), “transparency, translated into clear and explicit managerial targets combined with increased managerial autonomy and incentives to perform, makes it easier to establish the basis for managerial accountability and to achieve outputs (without which the notion of accountability becomes irrelevant . . .). This, in turn, increases political accountability in two ways. By making targets explicit, it is easier for managers—in dialogue with politicians—to match them with political priorities. And by monitoring the extent to which targets are met, politicians can, in turn, hold managers accountable for their performance or lack of it.”

80. This observation may challenge Moore’s (1997) claims, discussed below.